Regional Architecture in Asia: US Principles and Priorities

by Hillary Rodham Clinton (US Secretary of State) speech delivered in Imin Center-Jefferson Hall, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 12, 2010

Before I begin with this critically important subject about our future in Asia, I want to just say a few words about developments in Haiti. We are still gathering information about this catastrophic earthquake, the point of impact, its effect on the people of Haiti. The United States is offering our full assistance to Haiti and to others in the region. We will be providing both civilian and military disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. And our prayers are with the people who have suffered, their families, and their loved ones.

It is hard to even imagine how different the region we’re talking about today was back in 1959 when Lyndon Johnson proposed creating an institution where thinkers from East and West could come together. And during the five decades since the Center opened, no region has undergone a more dramatic transformation. This progress is the product of hard work and ingenuity multiplied across billions of individual lives. And it has been sustained by the engagement, security and assistance provided by the United States.

The East-West Center has been part of this sea change, helping to shape ideas and train experts, including one young woman who became a pioneer in microfinance and rural economic development and the mother of our President. And I thank all of you for bringing greater awareness and understanding to the economic, political, and security issues that dominate the region and the world today.

By now – almost a year into the new Administration – it should be clear that the Asia-Pacific relationship is a priority of the United States. President Obama spent his formative years here in Hawaii and in Indonesia. His world view reflects his appreciation of -- and respect for -- Asia and its people. I am deeply committed to strengthening our ties across the Pacific and throughout Asia. And I know the President is personally looking forward to Honolulu – his hometown – hosting the APEC leaders meeting in 2011. (Applause.) Now, I’ve been informed by the congressman, the governor, the mayor and others that the most difficult decision will be figuring out the aloha shirt that will be given to all of the leaders.

But for these reasons and more, we began last January to lay the foundation for a revitalized Asia-Pacific relationship. My first trip as Secretary of State was to Asia – in fact, this will be my fourth to the region in the last eleven months. President Obama participated in the APEC Summit in Singapore as well as visiting China, Japan, and South Korea; we supported the creation of a regular G-20 leaders summit with strong Asian participation reflecting the new global balance of financial and political power; we held the first ever U.S.-ASEAN summit; we signed the Guam International Agreement that helps sustain a strong U.S. military presence in the region; and we signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. And it was no accident that the first state visit hosted by President and Mrs. Obama was for an Asian leader, Indian Prime Minister Singh.

So we are working to deepen our historic ties, build new partnerships, work with existing multilateral organizations to pursue shared interests, and reach beyond governments to engage directly with people in every corner of this vast region.

We start from a simple premise: America’s future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America. The United States has a strong interest in continuing its tradition of economic and strategic leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United States remaining a dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing military influence.

Economically, we are inextricably linked. American companies export $320 billion in goods and services to the Asia-Pacific countries every year, creating millions of good-paying jobs. Hundreds of thousands of our servicemen and women provide the region with security – a task that our military has shouldered for generations. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, the United States is not a visiting power in Asia, but a resident power.

And conversely, Asia is an important presence in the United States. More than 13 million Americans trace their ancestry to this part of the world. Asian countries that were destitute a generation ago now boast some of the highest living standards in the world. East Asia has already surpassed the Millennium Development Goal of reducing extreme poverty to half its 1990 levels by 2015.

Asia is also indispensable to meeting global security and humanitarian challenges. Asian nations are helping to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran, build schools and clinics in Afghanistan, keep peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and combat piracy off the Horn of Africa.

Yet at the same time, Asia’s progress is not guaranteed. Asia is home not only to rising powers, but also to isolated regimes; not only to longstanding challenges, but also unprecedented threats. The dangers of nuclear proliferation, military competition, natural disasters, violent extremism, financial crises, climate change, and disease transcend national borders and pose a common risk.

And we must acknowledge that different countries in the Asia-Pacific region face their own different challenges. Some have made more progress politically than economically, and others the reverse. Some are consolidating reforms, others are struggling with ongoing or renewed instability. Regional cooperation must account for these diverse challenges and create more opportunities for broad-based prosperity and political progress.

A core strategic fact is that this region confronts these challenges and opportunities with a dynamic mix of influential actors, from rising powers like China and India, to traditional leaders like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to the increasingly influential states of Southeast Asia, like Indonesia. And the United States not only continues to have dynamic and durable bilateral ties, but plays a central role in helping to deal with the difficulties that individual states and this region confront. This new landscape requires us to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.

For years, Asian leaders have talked about strengthening regional cooperation, and Asia’s economic, political and security architecture is evolving. Regional institutions have already played a significant part in Asia’s evolution. Yet looking forward, we know that they can – and I would argue must – work better. That’s a common message I have heard from many of my conversations with Asian leaders and citizens during this past year. There is now the possibility for greater regional cooperation, and there is also a greater imperative.

Now, like any architecture of this building and anywhere else, regional architecture among and between nations requires a firm foundation. And today, I would like to outline the principles that will define America’s continued engagement and leadership in the region, and our approach to issues of multilateral cooperation. In formulating this approach we have consulted widely with our Asia-Pacific partners, and these are discussions that I look forward to continuing during my upcoming trip and the months ahead.

First, the United States' alliance relationships are the cornerstone of our regional involvement. The United States’ alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines are among the most successful bilateral partnerships in modern history. The security and stability provided through these relationships have been critical to the region’s success and development. Our shared values and strategic interests enabled generations to grow up and prosper in a region largely at peace, and they remain key to maintaining stability and security. Our commitment to our bilateral relationships is entirely consistent with – and will enhance – Asia’s multilateral groupings.

Beyond our treaty alliances, we are committed to strengthening relationships with other key players. We are pursuing a strategic dialogue with India, a strategic and economic dialogue with China, and a comprehensive partnership with Indonesia. We are working on strengthening our partnerships with newer partners like Vietnam and longstanding partners like Singapore. Strengthened multilateral cooperation should and must respect and build on our already proven bilateral partnerships.

Second, regional institutions and efforts should work to advance our clear and increasingly shared objectives. These include enhancing security and stability, expanding economic opportunity and growth, and fostering democracy and human rights.

To promote regional security, we must address nuclear proliferation, territorial disputes, and military competition – persistent threats of the 21st century.

To advance economic opportunity, we must focus on lowering trade and investment barriers, improving market transparency, and promoting more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable patterns of economic growth. Regional organizations such as APEC have already shown considerable progress in these areas. In addition, the United States is engaging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations as a mechanism for improving linkages among many of the major Asia-Pacific economies.

And to build on political progress, we must support efforts to protect human rights and promote open societies. We applaud ASEAN’s decision to establish a new Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights when the Association’s new charter went into effect in December of 2008. Over time, we hope the Commission and other regional initiatives will enhance respect for fundamental freedoms and human dignity throughout the region.

Third, our institutions must be effective and be focused on delivering results. This has been a priority for President Obama and me since Day One. Because we believe that Asia’s rise over the past two decades has given the region an opportunity for progress that simply didn’t exist before.

The formation and operation of regional groups should be motivated by concrete, pragmatic considerations. It’s more important to have organizations that produce results, rather than simply producing new organizations.

Now, dialogue is critical in any multilateral institution. But as Asian nations become regional and global players, we must focus increasingly on action. Groups should assess their progress regularly and honestly, and emphasize that all participants are responsible for playing a positive role.

For example, in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that devastated South and Southeast Asia, the world witnessed how concrete collective action and a relentless focus on results can provide hope in the face of tragedy. Beyond immediate assistance to areas hit by the tsunami, the disaster response was a catalyst for cooperation across the broader region. It helped to forge enduring political, military, and civilian relationships that have enhanced our ability to respond collectively to natural disasters. We should learn from this example, and act with similar urgency and efficiency in dealing with challenges such as climate change and food security. I am proud that the United States has been and will continue to be a leader in this area. Just this last year, we played a critical role in the civilian-military response that helped bring relief to areas ravaged by cyclones, such as the Philippines and others.

Now, to produce consistent results, institutions need effective governance. That doesn’t mean that every organization will use the same mechanism to make decisions. But it does mean that they should embrace efficient decision-making processes and, where appropriate, differentiated roles and responsibilities. At the same time, building serious multilateral institutions requires us to share the burden of operating them. Systems that reward free riders and minimalist contributions are designed to fail.

So on security matters, we are eager to strengthen the ASEAN Regional Forum. The United States will continue to participate in the Forum, and we hope to build on some recent successes, including an inaugural civil-military disaster relief exercise last May. The ASEAN Regional Forum should make good on the vision laid out at our meeting in Thailand last July for it to assume greater responsibilities for disaster relief and humanitarian operations. And the United States stands ready to assist in facilitating that. It should also build on the Forum’s demonstrated recognition that Burma and other regional human rights issues will have a substantial effect on regional peace and security. One reason I have established an ambassadorial post to ASEAN in Jakarta is to strengthen this institutionalized process.

Fourth, we must seek to maintain and enhance flexibility in pursuing the results we seek. Now, in some instances, large multilateral institutions may lack the tools necessary to manage particular problems. Where it makes sense, we will participate in informal arrangements targeted to specific challenges, and we will support sub-regional institutions that advance the shared interests of groups of neighbors.

Another example of that is the Six-Party Talks, which show the potential of an informal arrangement to advance shared interests. Key regional actors have joined together to pursue the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Now, making progress toward the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea we know will strengthen security across Asia-Pacific countries, and we are working with our Six-Party partners for a resumption of the Six-Party Talks in the near future.

We have engaged in an enhanced relationship the Lower Mekong countries. We have a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia, with Japan and South Korea, and we have informal arrangements guiding cooperation in the Straits of Malacca. And these are each examples of how this kind of multilateralism can produce effective outcomes. And I’m on my way to Australia, where Secretary Gates and I will be meeting in a 2+2 setting with our counterparts there. So we welcome further opportunities to engage this way, for example in trilateral dialogues with Japan and China, and with Japan and India.

When it comes to sub-regional institutions, we really believe that ASEAN is an important success story. It has made a bold decision to integrate across the economic, socio-cultural, and political-security spheres. We believe that a strong, integrated ASEAN will serve broader regional interests in stability and prosperity. And so we will continue to support ASEAN and we will continue emphasize capacity-building activities under the enhanced U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership and the economic-focused U.S.-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. President Obama had that valuable first-ever meeting with ASEAN’s ten leaders in Singapore.

Now, I know some people, their eyes may glaze over when you hear all these acronyms, but we need to recognize that these regional organizations are very important to the actors who are in them. And the failure of the United States not to participate demonstrates a lack of respect and a willingness to engage. And that is why I made it very clear upon becoming Secretary of State that the United States would show up. I don’t know if half of life is showing up, but I think half of diplomacy is showing up.

And as we’ve also seen new organizations, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we hope that we will be able to participate actively in many of those.

Fifth, we need to decide, as Asia-Pacific nations, which will be the defining regional institutions. So although we respect and will work with the organizations that countries themselves have created, some of recent vintage, it’s important that we do a better job of trying to define which organizations will best protect and promote our collective future.

Now, each may have its place and its purpose. But the defining ones will include all the key stakeholders. And these may be well-established, like APEC, or they could be of more recent vintage, like the East Asia Summit, or more likely, a mix of well-established and new. This is a critical question that we must answer together through consultation and coordination.

During his visit to Tokyo last year, President Obama conveyed the United States’ intention to engage fully with these new organizations. And as a part of this strategy, we propose to begin consultations with Asian partners and friends on how the United States might play a role in the East Asia Summit, and how the East Asia Summit fits into the broader institutional landscape, and how major meetings in the region can be sequenced most effectively for everyone’s time.

There is also a continuing need for an institution that is aimed at fostering the steady economic integration of the region based on shared principles and objectives. I think APEC is the organization that we and our partners must engage in, ensuring that it moves toward fulfilling that responsibility.

U.S. involvement and leadership in Asia-Pacific institutions, ranging from our support for and contributions to APEC to our response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, can benefit everyone. We can provide resources and facilitate cooperation in ways that other regional actors cannot replicate or, in some cases, are not trusted to do. No country, however – including our own – should seek to dominate these institutions. But an active and engaged United States is critical to the success of these.

As we reexamine our structures for cooperation, we should remember that power is not just concentrated in governments. We should develop organizations that harness the positive role of non-state groups such as civil society movements, NGOs in development enterprises, and businesses that play important and constructive roles in development. We should look for more ways to enhance military-to-military cooperation and decrease mistrust and misunderstanding.

Tomorrow, as I leave for Australia, I will be looking forward to our discussions with Prime Minister Rudd, who has been a leader in promoting dialogue in this region. We value his contributions, and I will use this trip, along with my stops in New Zealand and Pacific islands, as an opportunity to continue our consultation.

The people of the Asia-Pacific region have endured centuries of upheaval. The ultimate purpose of our cooperation should be to dispel suspicions that still exist as artifacts of the region’s turbulent past, and build in their place a future of openness, honesty, and progress for all of our people.

I visited the USS Arizona earlier today, which is always a moving experience, I’m sure, for everyone, as it is for me. And as we were leaving the memorial, Lieutenant General Darnell told me that he had recently hosted officials from Vietnam. And as they came out of the memorial, the Navy had flown a Vietnamese flag from the boat waiting. It was a stunning moment, stunning on both sides, certainly stunning for our Vietnamese visitors, and stunning for the United States. What other country would do that? What other country applauds the success, the prosperity, and development of former enemies, of competitors, of those who have different systems and different cultures and different points of view?

So I don’t think there is any doubt, if there were when this Administration began, that the United States is back in Asia. But I want to underscore that we are back to stay. (Applause.)

In the space of two generations, Asia has become a region in which the old is juxtaposed with the new, a region that has gone from soybeans to satellites, from rural outposts to gleaming mega-cities, from traditional calligraphy to instant messaging, and most importantly, from old hatreds to new partnerships.

Regional cooperation in our part of the world must reflect these new realities and the extraordinary potential that resides within. And the United States looks forward to expanding its engagement, and to working with our partners to help ourselves and this region realize our extraordinary promise.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MR. MORRISON: Now, we want to thank the Secretary for her inspiring speech. I also want to let her know that the architect of this building is the famous Chinese American I.M. Pei. And so we have every confidence your architecture will be as successful as his architecture.

Now I think we have time for maybe 10 minutes of questions.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Sure, absolutely.

MR. MORRISON: And so let me see if I can start with a student. And here’s Vijay.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton –

MR. MORRISON: Please mention your name and your country.

QUESTION: Sure. Vijay Paul Chattergy. I’m a student fellow with the East-West Center’s Asia-Pacific Leadership Program, and I’m actually from Honolulu, Hawaii.

SECRETARY CLINTON: A good country to be from. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton, thank you very much for helping to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the East-West Center by giving a major policy speech here. My question has to do with APEC 2011, which, as you said, will be here in Honolulu, Hawaii. I wonder if you would be willing to offer some advice and guidance to the leaders and the people of the state of Hawaii on how to take advantage of this one-in-a-lifetime opportunity to showcase the home state and birthplace of President Obama.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I don’t think it takes much to showcase Hawaii. (Laughter.) It is – I would come here every month on my way to somewhere, but that would be too obvious. (Laughter.) And so I have to ration myself, and I waited nearly a whole year.

I think, seriously, the opportunity for Hawaii, which is such a meeting place for East and West, is just extraordinary. And you have a lot of very smart, experienced leaders and experts not only here at the university and at the center, but elsewhere in this state who can put together a program that not only showcases the culture and the history, but the diversity, the extraordinary mixture of people from across the Asia-Pacific region, and do so in a way that I think serves as a reminder to our friends coming about what is possible, that certainly with the values that our country has and with the aloha spirit that Hawaii exhibits this could be a model for the imagination of what could be in the 21st century in many of the countries that will be visiting.

I also think there will be tremendous interest in President Obama’s childhood here, and I’m sure you’ll have to put together tours and do whatever else is necessary. But I think also his mother’s association with the East-West Center is a tremendous message. I never met her, but we were scheduled actually to be on a panel together on microfinance at the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995. Unfortunately, that was not possible. But I have studied her work and I have followed what she did when she returned and was here at the Center. So I think there will be a lot of interest in the President and his family.

Now, APEC itself, we have a great opportunity, as I was discussing with Foreign Minister Okada earlier today, because Japan will host the APEC summit in 2010 and then, of course, it will be here in Hawaii. I think APEC has an opportunity under the leadership of Japan and then of the United States to begin to build out this architecture that I was speaking of. What more can be done through APEC? And it has been very focused on trade, which is all too important and must be pursued, but I am increasingly focused, as the last APEC meeting in Singapore began to be, on sustainable prosperity, on broadly shared prosperity. We do not want to see the inequalities of a previous century being replicated amidst the steel and glass skyscrapers of a new age. And it is important for us to look for ways to encourage more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in many of the countries that will be represented.

So I think that there’s a lot to be done, and I would be remiss if I didn’t end by saying that we also have the opportunity to highlight the role of women in this region. It is something that I have worked on for many years. I hope that APEC can do more on these issues, on women, on climate change, on food security, on global health. There’s a whole range of them. But the more work we do on these transnational problems and on the stubborn challenge of inequity in societies, the more important it becomes to focus on women – (applause) – women as leaders of change within their families as well as their communities. In fact, as we have put together our food security initiative, depending upon the region of the world and the country, 60 to 70 percent of the farming in the world is done by women, and yet they are very often at the back of the line when it comes to having access to new technology, new seeds, new irrigation methods, and so much else.

So I think that it could be an exciting time, and I think Hawaii would be a particularly ripe environment for many of these exchanges to occur.

MR. MORRISON: Evelyn, did I see your hand up?

QUESTION: It’s an honor, Secretary Clinton. My name is Evelyn Pusal. I’m a citizen of Papua New Guinea, I place I know that you’ll be visiting, so thank you very much. I am also funded by the U.S. State Department here at the East-West Center to study. Leading up from your talk on women, out of the 109 seats in our parliamentary system, one seat is held by a woman in our country. Now, we have a very – our cultural system there is predominantly male-oriented and dominated, and so my question to you is for the women who want to take on more responsibility in leadership positions and also to make that transition to have more participation for women, how do you propose that we overcome these challenges to break through and have more women representation in our parliamentary system? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I’m very excited about going to your country. I’m looking forward to being there. I will be talking about women and women’s roles while I am in Papua New Guinea.

Let me just make three general points and then one specific about your country. First, the barriers that restrain women’s rights and responsibilities are legal in many places still. They are definitely cultural and to some extent political and social. And they are not easily removed unless there are enough women exercising leadership so that the barriers begin to just dissolve as people see what is possible.

So first, you have to tackle any remaining legal barriers in society. There are still countries where women can’t vote, where women can’t drive, where women can’t inherit property, and other challenges like that. And I think it’s imperative to have a full analysis of those kinds of barriers.

Now, with respect to cultural, political, social, it has been my experience over many years working in this field that there has to be a critical mass of men and women in a country speaking out. And what you will find in a number of societies that there is a sort of thin crust of the elite where women have all kinds of opportunities, where they get advanced education, where they have business opportunities, they travel, but then there is a big drop-off where most of the rest of women live and where they’re still most likely to be underfed, unschooled, unhealthy, and so much else.

And I think you have to go at that both politically, but also in a person-to-person approach. One of the reasons you may notice that the State Department is funding disproportionately women on some of these scholarships from some of these countries is because we hope you’ll go back and be able to make the case and be a model and be an example of what is possible. And of course, the NGO community, the United States Government, other institutions and individuals stand ready to help.

But finally, it seems that the old habits that prevent women from participating just have to be taken head on. There’s no way around it. (Applause.) You just have to be willing to confront it, and at some times at great personal cost. This is something that is not easy in many societies.

I will be meeting in Papua New Guinea with a new group of women military officers and security officers who have been recruited. Never happened before. And what we’ve seen is that there are ways of opening up opportunities for women by identifying problems that within the cultural norm of a society women are better able to address. So that for example in Pakistan, which has a very serious problem with domestic violence, as Papua New Guinea does, there was very little sympathy for women going to police stations. So part of the solution to deal with what is a crime was to train more women police officers and to have special sections of police stations so that women could go and report these crimes.

And I think that there’s lots of ways once you identify the problem of going straight ahead and saying this is the only way we’re going to solve it. Now, some countries have set quotas, as you may know, in electing women. And in some places it’s worked. Rwanda now has the highest proportion of women. Part of it is because with the massacre, disproportionately men were murdered, but it was also because the leadership of Rwanda concluded that having more women in positions of responsibility would create a better atmosphere for making some of the tough decisions on reconciliation to move the country forward.

So there are many different ways of approaching it, but I will be discussing it and speaking about it when I am Papua New Guinea.

MR. MORRISON: And our last question will be this woman.

QUESTION: Thank you very much for your wonderful speech. My name is Jia Qiong, East-West Center Ph.D. graduate student from China. Actually, you have been my role model for many years. (Applause.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you. I have a question regarding U.S.-China relations.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes.

QUESTION: U.S.-China relations play very important role in the stability for the world and for the Asia-Pacific region in particular. 2009 witnessed stable improvement of U.S.-China relationship with a collaborative effort of the two countries, including the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S.-China military high-level exchanges, and President Obama’s visit China (inaudible).

Recently, however, some media and think tanks expressed their worries and their pessimist view toward U.S.-China relations. For example, The Washington Post says the United States and China are headed for a rough patch and the Eurasia Group announced that U.S.-China relations the number one risk. And what is your opinion toward this kind of statement and prediction? Thank you so much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: You’re very welcome. Thank you. And I’m delighted you’re here at the East-West Center. We are very committed to the positive, cooperative, comprehensive relationship that both President Obama and President Hu stated was our goal during their summit in Beijing. And we intend to pursue our Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which I co-chair along with Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, to create a broad range of issues on which the United States and China are working together, are engaged together.

We know we have differences. We have differences with every country – countries that have been our friends for many, many decades. Two people have differences, so certainly two complex countries will have differences. We have differences of experience and perspective, but we are working to develop a relationship that will be a mature one, that will not be knocked off course when we do something or the other does something that we don’t agree with.

I’m well aware that there are many who on both sides, in China and in the United States, who are very skeptical of whether the United States and China can develop this kind of working relationship over the long term. But my view is that we should be committed to doing so and working very hard to do so. It is in both of our nations’ interests for China and the United States to have a productive relationship. It will be challenging and it will not come easily or quickly, but certainly President Obama and I are committed to that. And I hope that we have a similar level of commitment and confidence building in China as well.

I guess finally, because, of course, the relationship that China has with its neighbors as well as with the United States and the rest of the world will be so crucial to what happens in the 21st century, we hope that there will be increasing openness politically in China. We hope that there will be an opportunity for more of the Chinese people to exercise the full range of human rights and freedoms. And we say that to our friends in China in the leadership meetings that we have, and it is something that we believe would be in the best interest of China.

Similarly, we hope that there will be increasing trust building between our militaries so that General Xu’s visit and other visits by American military leaders to China will build confidence. We each have our national interests. We each have to be primarily responsible for our own people. But I honestly believe that both the Chinese and the American people will be safer and more prosperous in the future if we have a good, solid relationship between our two countries. And that’s what I’m working to achieve. Thank you. (Applause.)

Source: US Department of State

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Admitting the US and Russia to the regional architecture

By Kavi Chongkittavorn

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA are the two important global powers missing in the discussion of a new regional architecture. Both countries, through their existing economic and political ties, have approached the regional community-building effort differently - in ways that suit their perceived roles.

But they do share a common objective - to become parts of the ongoing dynamism in the region - whether it be East Asia, Asia or Asia-Pacific.

Proposals by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatomaya to establish a new regional institute have generated heated debates over the shape of things to come. Rudd's framework on the Asia Pacific community is more specific and widely discussed than Hatoyama's East Asia community, which up until now has not provided any details or modalities. However, both ideas support the ongoing regional institutions within Asean and would not dismiss the grouping as a foundation for future cooperation. Additional features, mandates, functions and members could be refined and added later on.

Numerous ideas have been proposed and discussed, concentrating on |mandates and membership that will cope with 21st century challenges. Participation of the US and Russia has repeatedly been mentioned as pivotal to any new set-up, particularly future membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS). For the US, the one-year-old Obama Administration's new attitude towards Asia and the ascension of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) has created an overall favourable atmosphere to expand and intensify its engagement within the region -commensurate with Obama's pronouncement as a Pacific power.

Akin to the US, Russia is also a member of regional organisations such as the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec). Both the US and Russia have fulfilled the three requirements set forth by Asean for admission to EAS�a dialogue partner and a signatory of TAC that has substantial relations with Asean. However, Moscow has been more assertive on this front. As far as Russia-Asean relations are concerned, Moscow has been pushing for closer economic and security cooperation but with little success. The Asean Centre at the Moscow State University of International Relations will soon be established.

In the early 1980s, Moscow tabled several proposals to establish a new regional security forum in anticipating post-Cold War strategic imperatives. Unfortunately, they fell on deaf ears. Moscow continues to view itself as a Europe-Asia power. One major impediment was the grouping's hostile attitude towards Moscow's support of proxy wars in the region. Once the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Soviet empire disintegrated, its pragmatic approaches and policies have propelled better cooperation and friendship with Asean and individual members.

In Kuala Lumpur, December 2005, Russia came close to becoming a foundation member of EAS or Asean plus six. Only last minute forceful intervention by certain Asean members stopped such an ambition after former US State Secretary Condoleeza Rice expressed serious concern over the planned admission. To save Moscow's political embarrassment, Malaysia, the host, quickly invited Russia as a guest to the inaugural EAS. Since then, Russia has continued to push for early EAS membership. Last year, it failed to convince Thailand, as the Asean chair, to push for its EAS membership and the second Asean-Russia summit.

Political turmoil inside the country and uncertainty surrounding a series of summits rendered twin initiatives impossible. At the next EAS in Hanoi in October, the second Asean-Russia summit has been scheduled. It is an open secret that Vietnam wants the second Asean-US leaders' meeting to be held also in the country. Obama offered to host the follow-up leaders' meeting with his Asean colleagues in his country this year when he met them last November.

The central question Asean has to tackle is whether the US should be invited to join EAS along with Russia, either in Hanoi this year or later on. In her speech last month at the Hawaii-based, East West Center, US State Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton made clear that Washington is interested in EAS and is studying how her country can associate with the five-year-old summit. She said the US proposed to begin consultations with Asian countries on how the US might play a role in the EAS and the summit would fit into the broader institutional landscape. That much was clear. At this juncture, Asean has yet to reach a consensus on the EAS enlargement even though there is no official moratorium policy. Several Asean dialogue partners who have fulfilled the three criteria also want to join EAS.

EAS could serve as a new overarching structure where concerned countries in the region can discuss pertinent transnational issues and subsequently deliver results.

Expansion of EAS will be less problematic because the membership is still small. Both ARF and Apec have big members straddling Asia, as well as North and South America. ARF has 27 members and Apec 21, but the latter includes Taiwan and Hongkong while India, the region's rising power, has been left out. After the September 11 tragedy, the Bush administration tried with some success to intensify anti-terrorism cooperation among the trade-focused members.

One way of sustaining Asean centrality within the common call for a new architecture is to admit the US and Russia together to EAS. Then, the so-called Asean plus six (Asean 10, India, Australia, New Zealand) will be transformed into Asean plus eight, leaving Asean plus three (APT) unchallenged--to be the only institution that represents real East Asian regional building. China, the APT prime mover would not object to such an arrangement as it would continue to be the APT driving force. Japan and South Korea have already utilised the APT as a platform to strengthen their ties with Asean and China.

The larger EAS has begun tackling broader issues including nuclear proliferation, climate change and food security - and would answer in part Rudd's proposal and Tokyo's insistence on having the US participate in a new regional architecture.

Finally, Asean would also need creative ideas to sequence a series of summits with dialogue partners to allow their leaders with super-tight schedules to attend them. Obviously, one cannot expect a US president to join Asean-initiated summits and leaders' meetings twice or thrice a year.

Source: The Nation

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Indonesia and the World 2010 (Part 2 of 2)

Marty M. Natalegawa

Indonesia's preoccupation with various global challenges in 2010 will not be at the expense of its commitment to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of its own region - Southeast Asia.

Almost mirroring Indonesia's democratic transformation over the past decade, the period since 2003 when Indonesia last held the Chairmanship of ASEAN, has witnessed ASEAN's own evolution towards an ASEAN Community.

This development has not been an accident. For Indonesia, the evolution of an ASEAN that is more alert to democratic principles and good governance is critical to ensure that there would not be a disconnect or divide between the transformation that has taken place within Indonesia and the regional milieu.

In 2010, with the Charter in place, ASEAN has all the Community which we all aspire by 2015. The urgency of concrete action by ASEAN cannot be underestimated.

In the broader region, the past year saw renewed interest in the idea of an East Asia or Asia-Pacific wide regional architecture.

Renewed because for Indonesia it is a debate that we had anticipated by forging ahead with the concept of an ASEAN Community. For Indonesia, there cannot be an East Asian community or an Asia Pacific without an ASEAN Community as its core constituent.

Thus, the ASEAN Community, the various "ASEAN +" processes, the ARF, APEC and East Asia Summit constitute a multi-pronged path towards an East Asia community with ASEAN playing a central role. This is a vision that will continue to guide us in 2010.

A notable emphasis, however, is the need to ensure that nationally, within our own borders, Indonesia itself is ready, including in terms of its national connectivity, in order to fully benefit from the regional community-building efforts.

Our global and regional diplomatic efforts will be underpinned by solid bilateral diplomacy.

In keeping with the tagline "one thousand friends, zero enemies", our foreign policy in 2010 will actively seek to raise to a higher level existing ties with countries in all corners of the globe - the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and the Americas. In this connection, besides the promotion of positive political and people-to-people relations, there will be renewed and focused efforts to promote economic diplomacy.

The promotion of trade, investment and tourism is critical to ensure that foreign policy brings tangible contribution to our development efforts. The foreign policy machinery will be galvanized for this purpose.

A special focus for our efforts will be in border diplomacy - namely to make headway in addressing outstanding border delineation and demarcation issues with neighboring states through negotiations.

Not least, foreign policy in 2010 will also be cognizant of so called "intermestic issues" - those which reflect the blurring of boundaries between international and domestic issues. One such issue is the question of protection of our nationals overseas, principally Indonesian workers overseas.

Indonesian foreign policy will strive to ensure a better recognition that there is natural mutually beneficial relationship between the host country and the sending country: that each Indonesian worker is after all making contribution to the country in which he/she finds employment, while conversely earning their living.

This fact must find better manifestation in the manner in which the responsibilities and rights of workers overseas are recognized. Indonesian foreign policy in 2010 will strive to ensure that the necessary legal frameworks are in place.

Above all, however, Indonesian foreign policy, indeed, each and every Indonesian diplomat, will continue to be imbued with the principles of partiality towards and protection for Indonesian nationals - without exception.

One issue that is also likely to continue to preoccupy is the efforts to overcome terrorism. Indonesia's foreign policy in 2010 will continue employing bilateral, regional and global efforts to overcome this threat.

It will also continue to address the so-called conditions conducive or root causes of terrorism. Inter-faith dialogue through bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation will be at the forefront of our diplomacy. Indeed, the entire spectrum of "soft power" will occupy a central place in our foreign policy.

I am of the firm view that to be effective, foreign policy demands a strong sense of ownership and participation by the stakeholders. Thus, democratization of Indonesian foreign policy will be key. On the one hand, this of course, relates to substance.

Indonesian foreign policy as we begin this second decade of the 21st century must reflect the democratic transformation within. However, it also relates to process. The foreign policy machinery must be open to interaction with stakeholders and, above all to new ideas and opportunities. The partnership and engagement with the DPR (the House of Representatives), more specifically its Commission I, is especially valued and critical. Foreign policy and diplomacy unites.

I do genuinely believe that Indonesian foreign policy stands at a cross road. We have an opportunity to take Indonesia's international role to another level. A country engaged constructively in its own region and at the same time able to contribute significantly to global issues and concerns.

Such a role, of course, must be earned through the quality of our diplomacy. Through the contribution of the men and women who make up our diplomatic machinery, whose dedication and hard work I wish to acknowledge today.

Above all, through the support and partnership of all stakeholders. Insya Allah (God willing).

The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister's annual policy statement on Jan. 8, 2010.

Source: The Jakarta Post

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Part 1 of 2: Indonesia and the world 2010

Marty M. Natalegawa

By any measure, the first decade of the 21st century has been a momentous one for Indonesia. The decade witnessed the transformation of Indonesia into what has been hailed as the third largest democracy in the world.

As a result, some one quarter billion of humanity now enjoys the civil and political rights, in addition to economic and social rights hitherto denied them. A solid evidence that democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand in hand.

Not least, the past decade has proven another indisputable fact: the resilience of the Indonesian nation. Where once political obituaries were written about the demise of Indonesia gripped by multi dimensional crisis, not least separatist threats, Indonesia today is thriving as never before. Above all, where once self-generated doubts were common among some quarters about Indonesia’s role in the world, today opportunities abound.

Indeed, where foreign policy is concerned, the year ahead promises much in solidifying Indonesia’s place in the world: the reaping of its democratic dividend. A nation able to strengthen its contribution within its immediate region of Southeast Asia and yet at the same time enhancing its global interests and concerns. A nation able to concretize its vision of a thousand friends and zero enemy. All aimed at promoting its national interests.

Of course, in carrying out its foreign policy this year, Indonesia, like other nations, cannot be oblivious to the external milieu it is likely to face. If the past year provides any guide, it is that we are truly in the midst of a transformational phase in international relations. The tests the international community faced in 2009 make for a depressing list: financial, economic, energy and food crisis; threat of global pandemic; the challenge of climate change.

These are just a few examples. Multifaceted in its form and simultaneous in time. Their trans-boundary and indeed global nature remind that comprehensive solutions can be found only by means of international cooperation. Even the mightiest of nations find it impossible to address issues whose enduring characteristic is their non conformity with state boundaries. The year 2010 is unlikely to be any different. Thus, multilateral approach and solutions remain indispensable.

In 2010, Indonesia will continue to invest heavily in its multilateral diplomacy. The United Nations must remain central in addressing the various global challenges and crisis we are likely to face in the year ahead. To be effective, however, reform of the UN, in particular its Security Council, to better reflect the contemporary world, is essential.

Indonesia will continue to be at the forefront in promoting the role of the United Nations in tackling global crises and at the same time in calling for its reform. Democratization of governance, after all, extends beyond national boundaries. Democratization of global institutions and governance is equally key.

While confronting newly arisen crisis is the task of United Nations, its Charter-mandated responsibilities in promoting economic development and progress cannot be held in abeyance. The year 2010 will be particularly significant as the UN convene a special leaders meeting to review progress made in implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

Also not to be ignored is the unfinished business of climate change. Despite the nature of the challenge, the Copenhagen conference at the end of 2009, as anticipated, did not quite produce the legally binding outcome. Yet, it is important that positive momentum continue to be built with the objective of reaching a legally binding commitment during the course of 2010. Inaction is not an option.

Indonesia’s diplomacy will continue to actively strive to promote consensus and, at the same time, through concrete national actions, demonstrate what can be achieved if each nation shoulder its own responsibilities. Indeed, the year ahead is expected to bear witness to an enhanced role by Indonesia in building bridges among divides.

Our foreign policy will consistently project Indonesia as part of the solution to various global challenges; of a country keen to accentuate the overlapping of interests and concerns rather than competing interests and concerns. Such bridge-building endeavor will extend beyond the United Nations to include other multilateral fora within which Indonesia is active and in confronting the multitude of issues confronting the international community. Of note, among them, is Indonesia’s participation within the G20.

As G20 confirms its status as the premier forum on economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to carve a niche within the Group that is unique to itself as the world’s third largest democracy, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population and a voice of moderation. While we are likely to continue to confront transformational challenges in 2010 – at the same time, perennial and “traditional”, political and security challenges will continue. This mix of the traditional and non-traditional; the old and new is a reality that challenges the conduct of our foreign policy.

In the Middle East, Israeli-sourced violence and violation of international law and previously agreed commitments persist. Indonesia will continue to consistently support the Palestinian cause and the peace process aimed at realizing an independent Palestinian State. The reinvigoration of diplomatic efforts by the Quartet, including the United States, must be encouraged. Nor would Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2010 be oblivious to continuing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There has not been a deficit of international attention on the situation in the aforementioned countries. Indonesia for its part will stand ready to contribute in a manner that is in keeping with its own capacities and foreign policy principles and, of course, based on the assessed needs identified by the countries themselves.

Despite the renewed attention on the perceived nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula and Iran, the year 2010 is likely to be notable for the likely promise it offers to make substantial progress on efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons. The responsibilities resting on the nuclear weapon states to ensure deep cuts in their nuclear armaments are clear.

Nationally, as well as Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement on disarmament issues, Indonesia will play an active role in the forthcoming NPT review Conference in New York in May 2010. Indonesia also will continue to play an active role within the NAM. Such a role will be complemented by continued active engagement within the G77 as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister’s annual policy statement on Jan. 8.

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Indonesia and the G20

By Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, WASHINGTON D.C.

During the November 2008 Summit in Washington, D.C., the leaders of advanced economies stood on an equal footing with their emerging nations’ counterparts addressing the global economic and financial issues candidly.

The deliberations yielded clear instructions to their relevant ministers and enabled officials to put flesh on the action plan to be immediately implemented to restore global confidence and generate further reforms in the world’s financial systems.

This was an unprecedented joint endeavor involving countries which represent 85 percent of the US$60 trillion global economy, 80 percent of global trade and 67 percent of the world’s population. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia alone have a combined population of almost 3.2 billion people and a collective GDP of $8.4 trillion, or about 15 percent of the world’s GDP.

The United States has been instrumental in leading and pulling together those countries and members of the G20, yet going forward, another key factor in the equation would be President Barack Obama and his priority on the G20 process. In his campaign promises outlined in March 2008 and on several occasions lately, Obama called for an overhaul of the financial system and to establish a 21st-century regulatory system. Obama’s administration seemed to be less aligned with its European counterparts in suggesting larger European stimulus packages and on the issue of regulations and supervision for all major financial players. Obama’s participation at the April 2 Summit in London and the commitment made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton however, have been a testimony of the present administration’s commitment to the G20 process, particularly on the need to address the present global financial crisis collectively.

For Indonesia, the main policy option will be how best to capitalize on the G20 membership in order to advance its interests, especially as it provides an avenue to engage itself with countries of the G8 as a “global steering group” on high profile and priority issues.

Many policy options preferred by developing countries have found a new channel to be advanced in the summit. Although developing countries like Indonesia have recently been more assertive in their attempt to contribute to the global policy agenda, their impact has been fairly modest. According to a study by Leonardo Martinez-Diaz of the Brookings Institution, in the eight years of G20 Finance Ministers ‘and Central Bank Governors’ meetings, the forum has mainly served as a vehicle for mobilizing support for G7 policies.

Today Indonesia stands in a unique position. It is one among the few and happens to be the only Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) country in the G20 summit process.

Indonesia is among those that are major and middle economic and financial powers, major energy exporters and importers, major players in the global as well as regional security arena, and the major polluters of the world. Indonesia is being positioned in such a way to enable it to connect the region with, and advance its interests in, the G20 process.

Some may construe Indonesia’s membership of this new grouping as a reflection of its growing influence on the world stage. Indonesia has capitalized on a number of short-term but critically important gains for charting a strategic framework of engagement in the G20 summit. It co-chairs the G20 working group on the reform of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks.

Its activism contributes to any future decisions pertaining to larger financial access for developing economies. At the same time, it pushes for a greater voice and representation for developing economies in the functioning of the existing multilateral development banks.

Indonesia had recently shown an economic and financial trajectory which helped cushion the tremendous pressure from the global financial and economic challenges. Strenuous structural reforms to improve the investment climate, strengthen economic fundamentals and the financial sector, as well as strengthen regulatory frameworks and legal systems that have been conducted, bear its present results.

Various other measures that have been taken, such as strengthening the food-based industry, and expanding and improving the quality of health services and education, attune Indonesia to the current circumstances. An expanding middle class is developing. The steps taken, as well as the prevailing circumstances today, have ensured Indonesia fits into the dynamic of the G20 Summit.

What needs to be critically maintained is Indonesia’s participation based on its pragmatic approach; one with its meticulously set priorities of national economic and security interests.

In a grouping such as the G20, alliances will be dynamic, established and re-established constantly on issues of common interests. When, on certain issues, Indonesia needs to align or re-align with countries both within and beyond the grouping, then and only then, Indonesia will be the one who decides whether it can afford to shift alignment in order to pursue the foremost priority of its interests.

The writer is a member of the Indonesian Foreign Service. The views expressed in this article are solely the author’s personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Indonesia

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Obama on Israel Gaza Conflict

By Beth Shaw

Barack Obama speaks out on the Israel Gaza conflict? No. Are you kidding!?! Of course not. Read about his reaction and the reaction of others to his reaction below.

The Middle East is exploding. I realize that’s not something that is new, but this particular war is new. Israel finally responded to the constant rocket attacks on Southern Israel by Hamas on December 27th. Last night, during the night, they pushed into Gaza on the ground with tanks and boots on the ground.

All hell has broken loose.

Hamas, predictably, carried on about how they were being picked on by Israel and boasted that they would kill every Jew in the world and renew suicide bombings. Not necessarily in that order. As Israeli troops pushed into Gaza, Hamas started crying foul and saying they never said anything bad about Israelis, they were just joking … haha …. they take it all back. Make those mean ol’ Jews go back to Israel!

Meanwhile, world leaders are weighing in. Surprisingly, even Arab nations have not run to the side of Palistine. Iran being the exception, of course. Egypt has refused to open the border between their two nations, having closed it a year or so ago because they were as tired of being beat up by Hamas as Israel was. Jordan has taken a hands off approach. The European Union has come down on the side of Israel as has California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger! Heh! The White House has taken a hard line stance against the terrorist attacks of Hamas against Israel as part of the Global War on Terrorism.

France has condemned Israel’s self defense. But then … well … that’s France.

And so, the world looked to President-elect Barack Obama to step up to the plate to make a statement. Is he for Israel? Is he for Hamas? Will he stand by his campaign promises? Each side waits and wonders, depending on which group he was talking to and making promises to at any given time. What, what, oh what will the soon to be President do?

And there is silence.

Seriously, does this surprise anyone? This is a man who voted ‘Present’ when any controversial vote was taken during the entire time he was a Illinois State Senator and barely darkened the Halls of Congress while he was a United States Senator. Controversy obviously makes him quite uncomfortable.

You know what they say, avoiding conflict creates unavoidable conflict. Such is the case for Obama. Everyone is getting mad at him for doing nothing. I’m still surprised that his avoidance of controversial issues surprises anyone.

He has sent his people out to tell anyone asking questions that he’s observing and absorbing and studying world events. He’s pondering things. Thinking about it. Looking at it. Well, that makes me feel better! Ha! Then they tell people to back off cause he’s not President yet. Canned statement for every controversial event.

Khaled Meshaal, the leader of the Hamas Islamist movement, is furious. He says Obama didn’t hesitate to make comments about the terrorist attacks on Mumbai, India. Why then does he refuse to comment on what he views as the Israeli aggression on Gaza? He seems to view that as Obama’s support of Israel. See, when you don’t take sides, then every side thinks you are against them. This is something most of us learn on the elementary school playground. But if you are attending the most exclusive and expensive private school in the country as Obama did, I guess you don’t have to worry about playground politics.

Not to worry. Obama is out of sight during this conflict, but that doesn’t mean he’s not working. He still wants needs your money. I got an email from him just today telling me how important it was for me to donate anything I could to his ‘Obama for America’ fund. I don’t know what that fund is being used for. It might be for his offshore accounts for all I know. If you don’t want to donate to his various funds, then you can buy some Obama commemorative stuff that’s for sale everywhere.

For a man that raised more money than any presidential candidate ever, he still seems to need a lot of our money. If not in donations, then by taxing us into poverty.

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2009 strategic political, economic trends in E. Asia (Part 2 of 2)

By Jusuf Wanandi

Learning how to deal with each other as neighbors and major regional powers is critical not only for the two individual nations, but also for the broader region in general.

That is why regional cooperation institutions should assist them in finding the right modus vivendi. The role of the United States in supporting Japan is not helpful. It should be left to China and Japan to find the balance in their relationship. In the early 1990s, following the bursting of its economic bubble, Japan entered a decade-long recession and deflation — a period that was prolonged by inadequate government policies, especially in the financial and banking sector. In the past few years, the economy has started to grow again, albeit slowly.

But now, again, Japan’s economy is in recession. Although the financial sector has been notably strengthened, dependency on exports is still high and demand has already slowed, while domestic consumption has not increased. Japan still faces several economic constraints, such as demographic problems including an aging society, inadequate productivity levels, low levels of foreign direct investment, rising poverty and worsening income inequality.

These are real issues that need to be tackled. It appears that Japanese leaders have been paying a great deal of attention to foreign policy and security, as well as to social issues such as education, but have not focused enough attention on the economy — especially in terms of continuing Koizumi’s economic reforms.Moreover, Japan’s economic needs intersect with the ambitious security goals of some of the country’s recent leaders: Japan needs to be economically stronger if it is going to be able to play a bigger role in East Asia. Meanwhile, political reforms have not been moving as fast as needed, which is hampering any other reforms.In the end, the most important relationship for China is with the United States. Since the spy plane incident early in his first term, relations have been stable under President Bush. Both have tried to find common ground and expand on both security and economic ties, as well as on issues such as democracy and human rights.

The relationship between these two countries will always be one of both cooperation and competition. The intricate integration of their economies provides significant motivation for cooperation. China’s strategy not to push its own global and regional order but instead to adapt to the existing system of world governance (with a few exceptions when vital interests are involved) has greatly alleviated a lot of prejudice and misjudgment on the part of the United States (and the “West” in general).

Especially at this juncture, when the United States is under siege and has lost some soft power and ability to lead, China and East Asia in general have been farsighted and statesmanlike enough not to gloat or be arrogant regarding the mistakes of the United States. Not only is this wise, as the United States still has a lot of “power” left, but as history has shown, its political and economic system is flexible and innovative enough to be able to make corrections swiftly and come out even stronger. So the future of the United States is not completely a lost cause. After all, we are all in this financial mess together.Besides, China does not have ideas incompatible with the rest of East Asia and has in general benefited from the existing international system, despite the occasional setback. It has not always been consistent, as many interests have to be balanced simultaneously.

In the end, Japan’s leaders may be forced to take action to address problems associated with the country’s lackluster growth and aging population (much as Koizumi did with nonperforming loans) because these issues will place heavy financial pressures on voters.

Trends suggest that, in the longer term, the international system will be multipolar and see greater input and more ideas coming from East Asia and China.

How this current crisis of capitalism is ended, as dictated by the West, should be an indication of how soon this change in values and norms will happen.

East Asia and China should, as always, learn from history. Shifts of power have always been painful and many historical mistakes have been made as a result of arrogance and impatience.

We in East Asia, having always had a long historical perspective, should therefore be patient, cooperative and inclusive in all future developments of the global system of governance.

We have to be aware of our own weaknesses and deficiencies and improve on them. We should also be aware of our obligations (and rights) in this process of change in the international order. We must support a system that will bring welfare, peace and stability to East Asia.

The writer is vice chair of the Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Jakarta. Source: The Jakarta Post

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