Marty M. Natalegawa, Washington, DC | Wed, 09/22/2010 10:00 AM | Opinion in the Jakarta Post
Nations today must face the fact that we live in a globalized and networked world. And that this world is in the grip of formidable challenges.
The United States and Indonesia have been addressing the need for change. It stands to reason that both will get better results — and contribute more to the welfare of humankind if we work together.
Today, the United States and Indonesia — respectively the second and the third largest democracies in the world — which means that we are both totally committed to the same values and ideals, including those enshrined in the UN Charter. Thus, the prospect for our bilateral relations are the best they have ever been.
It was in recognition of this fact that in November 2008 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono proposed the idea of forging a Comprehensive Partnership between our two countries.
The United States quickly and favorably responded to the idea. When State Secretary Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia in February 2009, she proclaimed support for such a comprehensive partnership — covering a wide range of fields that are crucial to Indonesia’s development, including education, health, science and technology, food and energy security, national security, trade and investment and sustainability of the environment.
If I had stood before you like this some 12 years ago, I should not be talking of a Comprehensive Partnership with the United States. At that time, Indonesia had a gaping democracy deficit. In the midst of the Asian financial crisis, we suffered a negative GDP growth of 13.5 percent — and social turmoil.
But today we have a new Indonesia. We have launched and sustained an era of reformasi. Having made our democratic transition, we are conscious of the significance of being recognized as the world’s third largest democracy — with democracy, Islam and modernization can flourish together.
Our democracy is delivering socioeconomic dividends to our people. Thus when the global financial crisis struck in 2008, sending the world economy on a tailspin, the Indonesian economy grew by 6.0 percent that same year and by 4.5 percent in 2009. It is expected to grow by 5.5 percent this year and by 6.4 percent next year — the third highest growth rate among G20 countries after China and India.
Our non-oil exports were valued at US$100 billion last year. Our foreign exchange reserves have reached an unprecedented high of $78 billion, while our debt to GDP ratio went down to an unprecedented low of 27.8 percent. Our poverty rate continues to decline, our credit rating keeps rising. Agriculture being the backbone of our economy, our food security continues to strengthen.
Because our people are enjoying these dividends, our democracy is robust and durable. Our national unity is strengthened. As a nation we are more socially cohesive than ever before.
We have transparency in government. The democratic checks and balances of power are always at work. Our justice system has scored many notable victories against the vice of corruption. But we are not complacent. We have to continue to invest in and nurture our democratic institutions.
Not least, we are striving to ensure that there is no disconnect between our democratization and the regional milieu. It is certainly not a coincidence that Indonesia’s democratic transformation over the past decade has been paralleled by change within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Thus in the same way that we have a democratic Indonesia, we have an ASEAN that is transforming itself by its commitment to democratic values.
As Indonesia consolidates within, and contributes to ASEAN community-building, it is also promoting its world view on the so-called regional architecture building.
A geopolitical shift to the Asia-Pacific region has been quite pronounced and likely to continue.
Indonesia believes that the Asia-Pacific region need not slip into a Cold War-type environment of mutual suspicion and hostility. In this, ASEAN’s role will continue to be invaluable.
Today, ASEAN continues to strive to earn such central role by tackling head on the issue of regional architecture building. The forthcoming expansion of the East Asia Summit by including the United States and the Russian Federation is one such response.
Indonesia looks forward to working closely with the United States within the framework of the envisaged Comprehensive Partnership to help bring about such a regional architecture. Beyond the Asia-Pacific region, we look forward to collaborating with the United States in the reform of the United Nations that reflects the realities of the contemporary world.
Within the framework of G20 we will strive alongside the United States to reform the international financial architecture and give the developing world a bigger say in global economic-decision making.
We can pursue a common advocacy for nuclear disarmament that will eventually lead to a world of zero nuclear weapons. And a common advocacy to save our tropical forests, our oceans and coral reefs — to mitigate and control the ravages of global warming.
We invite the United States to support our efforts at promoting democratic values through such endeavors as the Bali Democracy Forum. We are ready to work with the United States in fostering peace and mutual understanding wherever there is conflict or tension.
And we invite the United States to join our ongoing efforts to promote interfaith and dialogue among civilizations — as a way of building a bridge of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Western and Muslim world.
There is so much that we can do with this Comprehensive Partnership. The success of that comprehensive partnership will tell a great deal not just about the United States and Indonesia, not just about the West and about Islam but also about democracy and how it can be made fruitful for all humankind.
The article is an excerpt of keynote speech by Foreign Minister Marty M. Natalegawa at the Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC on Sept. 17, 2010.
Showing posts with label Indonesia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indonesia. Show all posts
US-RI relation: History, progress and prospect
Post Ministerial Conferences between ASEAN and Dialogue Partners (PMCs+1)
ASEAN today hold a series of Post Ministerial Conferences in Ha Noi with 10 Dialogue Partners, namely China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, EU, the US and Canada. These meetings serve as crucial preparatory steps for the upcoming Related Summits between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners in the second half of the year. As usual practice, at these Meetings, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and their counterparts reviewed relationships in the past year and set forth ways and means to promote future cooperation. The main Agendas of these Meetings include:
1. Strengthening effective, substantive and comprehensive cooperation between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners: from assistance to ASEAN in realising its community-building goal and promoting connectivity to addressing the emerging challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, epidemics, maritime security… At these Meetings, ASEAN adopted Plans of Action in the new period with some Dialogue Partners namely India, Canada and New Zealand.
2. Preparing for the important Related Summits which shall be held at the end of the year, including the annual Summits between ASEAN and China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and India as well as those special Summits with Russia, the US, the United Nations, Australia and New Zealand. The Ministers agreed in principle on the agenda, priorities and documents for these Summits.
3. Exchanging views on strengthening regional cooperation, including the possibility of wider participation and deeper engagement of Dialogue Partners in the process of shaping the regional architecture. The Dialogue Partners reaffirmed their support for ASEAN’s central role in the region and shared ASEAN’s common vision of a future regional architecture that will be multi-level, mutually-supportive, and being built upon existing mechanisms.
ASEAN welcomed Russia and the U.S’s expressed interest in engaging deeper with the evolving regional architecture, including the participation in the EAS as members, with appropriate arrangement and timing.
Following are the salient features of these Meetings:
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with China
The Meeting was chaired by H.E Dr. Pham Gia Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, as Country Coordinator of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations. On future direction for cooperation, ASEAN and China agreed to: i) hasten the drafting of a new Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity for the period of 2011-2015 to be submitted to the 13th ASEAN-China Summit for adoption.; ii) realize the initiatives for ASEAN-China cooperation, including infrastructure, energy, ICT... as well as the use of China-assisted funds namely the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund worth US$ 10 billion and the Credit Fund for Commercial Exchange of US$ 15 billion; iii) enhancing cooperation for peace, stability and prosperity in the region, including cooperation within the framework of ASEAN+3, EAS, ARF and in implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); iv) recommend the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations throughout the year of 2011.
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with Russia
The Ministers welcomed good progress in implementing the ASEAN - Russia Comprehensive Program of Action to Promote Cooperation for 2005-2015; discussed preparations for the 2nd ASEAN-Russia Summit hat will be held later in the year, including recommendation for a draft Statement, convening of the Russia-ASEAN Business Forum; the ASEAN-Russia Cultural Cooperation Agreement; discussed and agreed on specific activities in preparations for the Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations, including the holding of Days of Russian Culture in ASEAN Member Countries.
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with the United States of America
To further implement the decisions of the 1st ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in 2009 and prepare for the 2nd ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in 2010, the two sides agreed to finalise a Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-US Partnership for the new period of 2011-2015; strengthening cooperation in areas of mutual interest, particularly economic, trade and investment cooperation, science and technology, education as well as in addressing emerging challenges like epidemics, energy security, disaster management, climate change… ASEAN welcomed the establishment of a US Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta. ASEAN and the US agreed to work closely toward the convening of the 2nd ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting to be held later in the year.
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with Japan
ASEAN welcomed Japan’s proposal to further promote the cooperation between ASEAN and Japan toward economic growth through enhancing ASEAN connectivity within the framework of “ASEAN-Japan Partnership for New Growth in Asia”. Japan reaffirmed its continued support to ASEAN Community building efforts, including narrowing development gap through contribution to the ASEAN-Japan Integration Fund; and offered to provide 800 million Yen assisting the implementation of the Master plan on ASEAN Connectivity. ASEAN and Japan committed for the early entry into force and effective implementation of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP).
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting with Republic of Korea(ROK)
ASEAN and the ROK agreed to work closely for the effective implementation of ASEAN-ROK FTA agreement with a view to increasing two-way trade volume to US$ 150 billion by 2015. The Ministers agreed to submit the proposal to elevate the ASEAN-ROK Dialogue Relations to Strategic Partnership, and a draft Joint Declaration on ASEAN-ROK Strategic Partnership to the Leaders at the forthcoming ASEAN-ROK Summit in Ha Noi later this year.
ASEAN expressed its appreciation to the ROK for inviting Viet Nam, as the Chair of ASEAN, to attend the G-20 Summit in Seoul this November. On this occasion, ASEAN extended deep sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of the ROK for the loss of lives resulting from the sinking of the Cheonan ship; called on all parties concerned to exercise utmost self-restraint and resolve all differences by peaceful means.
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with India
The two sides adopted the Plan of Action to implement the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity for 2010-2015; agreed to strengthen cooperation in trade-economics, science and technology, ICT, environment as well as in response to challenges like terrorism, trans national crimes. The Ministers tasked their officials to initiate projects to be sponsored under the ASEAN-India Green Fund and the ASEAN-India Science and Technology Development Fund. The two sides discussed preparations for the 20th Anniversary of the ASEAN-India Dialogue Relationship in 2012.
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with Australia
The two sides emphasized on the significance and importance of effectively implementing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) which entered into force early this year; agreed to accelerate the implementation of the Plan of Action to realise the ASEAN-Australia Enhanced Partnership with focus on areas of education, trade and investment, transport, sustainable use of resources, disaster management, culture, people-to-people exchange etc. ASEAN and Australia agreed to convene an ASEAN-Australia Summit on the sideline of the 17th ASEAN Summit in the second half of 2010 to give strong impetus to the Dialogue relations.
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with New Zealand
The Ministers adopted the ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration on Enhanced Partnership for 2010-2015; focusing on cooperation in education, culture and people-to-people exchange. ASEAN welcomed New Zealand’s new proposals for cooperation, including a $ 54 million support for ASEAN students to be trained in New Zealand in the next 3 years. The two sides appreciated the significance and importance of effectively carrying out the AANZFTA which entered into force at the begining of this year. ASEAN and New Zealand agreed to convene the ASEAN-New Zealand Commemorative Summit back-to-back with the 17th ASEAN Summit in Ha Noi.
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with Canada
The Ministers adopted the Plan of Action to implement the Declaration on ASEAN-Canada Enhanced Partnership for 2011-2015; agreed to work toward an ASEAN-Canada Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to enhance trade and investment relations. ASEAN welcomed Canada’s signing of the Instrument of Accession to the TAC, which marks another significant progress in the Dialogue relationship, as well as Canada’s commitment to peace, stability and cooperation in the region.
At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with the EU
ASEAN and the EU agreed to promote the implementation of programmes and activities to realise the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership; especially boosting region-to-region economic cooperation.
ASEAN appreciated EU’s determination to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and informed the EU of the signing of the 3rd Protocol amending the TAC to be held on 23 July which would pave the way for the EU’s accession to the TAC at an early stage.
ASEAN presence a prerequisite in any future Asia Pacific community
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post | Sat, 05/01/2010 10:45 AM | Discourse
Jakarta has recently welcomed Russia and the US to join in the East Asia Summit (EAS) after years of veering away from admitting new members into the 16-strong-grouping. The proposal is aimed at bringing together the two Cold War rivals with the 10 ASEAN member-states plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Lilian Budianto on the reasons behind this shift in foreign policy.
Question: What led to the decision to welcome Russia and the US into the EAS?
Answer: It is an undoubted fact that the geopolitical trend today and for the immediate future rests on the increasing prominence of Asia, East Asia, and Asia Pacific in general. Whatever we do in our region, in terms of its regional architecture, geopolitical underpinning and structure, will have not only regional but also global implications.
To put things in the global context, our national perspective is to ensure what we call dynamic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific region. Dynamic equilibrium marked by the absence of domination of any single power; dynamic equilibrium where countries can engage with one another in a mutually beneficial and peaceful way. Given this kind of background and geopolitical concerns, we have become recently aware of ideas such as the Asia Pacific Community and the East Asia Community as suggested by some countries. We are looking at where we are now and how we should proceed. Inaction is not an option.
We are aware that we have to think this through. In the first months of my tenure I am very much in the listening mode. I want to know what are the latest ideas and thoughts. Having listened to the Australian and Japanese ideas, we come to several conclusions. One, we must continue with the ASEAN community building track. We must not be diverted away from the ASEAN community track because any future Asia Pacific community must have as a constituent element the ASEAN community. It’s a prerequisite. So, first and foremost we must continue to integrate ourselves into ASEAN community building efforts by 2015.
However, you can walk and whistle at the same time. So, when I said we must concentrate and put emphasis on ASEAN community building, it does not mean that everything else must be put on hold.
Where there are gaps, where there is room for improvement, then we must have the courage to improve and to undertake that. This is where the East Asia Summit comes in, especially vis a vis how best to engage or find the right modalities for the deepening of US and Russia engagement in the region. This is still the ongoing discussion. We have yet to find the right modality, whether via the East Asia Summit or other.
Does ASEAN look to have both Russia and the US joining at one time or it can come in sequence?
Russia has been knocking on the door for some time. They are there and want to join the EAS. We have formally stated that we welcome Russia’s participation in the summit, which is an evolution in our position. At the same time we would also welcome, the US in the EAS, if they wish to join. But we have yet to hear formally from them. Now in terms of the sequence, as to which comes before, that is something we can think through further. Ideally, it would be nice to think that they can do things in tandem or in concert in terms of procedures.
Why not just do it in one go. But there is also the geopolitical context as well, that it would be ideal if both these relatively large countries proceeded in concert.
But these are all still possibilities. It is not Indonesia’s business to suggest anything to these countries because we are yet to fully ascertain what is the preferred modality.
Do all ASEAN member states already agree in principle to include Russia and the US?
This is still being discussed. The leaders in their summit in Hanoi have tasked foreign ministers to consider fully.
the whole subject of regional architecture. I think, to be honest, this will be forever a work-in-progress. There won’t be one day when we can say that it is all done. This is something fluid and dynamic, constantly evolving. There won’t be a moment in time when we say we are not perfect right now and after the two countries join us, this is it. No, we are constantly evolving in a dynamic and fluid situation. Indonesia revels in this kind of dynamic. We are not worried.
We find this dynamic equilibrium is the type of diplomacy that will make progress. We need to be alert to the evolving situation.
Do you have any timeline to complete the discussion on the expansion?
I don’t want to reduce it to the whole issue of expansion per se. It is more than simply an expansion. The fact is we have the ministerial meeting in Hanoi this July and then we have the summit this October and so there will be at least those opportunities to see whether progress can be made.
Indonesia will be chairing ASEAN in 2011 and this is a good opportunity along the line for us to be part of the effort to help shape our regional architecture. For us, sooner is better than later. No need to postpone things that can be done. But at the same time, we are very much aware that this is about comfort levels, we must proceed as they said in ASEAN language: at the best comfortable rate for all.
Source: The Jakarta Post
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I don’t want to reduce it to the whole issue of expansion per se. It is more than simply an expansion. The fact is we have the ministerial meeting in Hanoi this July and then we have the summit this October and so there will be at least those opportunities to see whether progress can be made.
Indonesia will be chairing ASEAN in 2011 and this is a good opportunity along the line for us to be part of the effort to help shape our regional architecture. For us, sooner is better than later. No need to postpone things that can be done. But at the same time, we are very much aware that this is about comfort levels, we must proceed as they said in ASEAN language: at the best comfortable rate for all.
Source: The Jakarta Post
The role of Indonesia in the region and the world
Juwono Sudarsono, Canberra Mon, 05/03/2010 9:37 AM Opinion
Indonesia’s strategic vision is defined by its strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic location which defines its perennial interest in keeping track of security trends in the linkages of regional clusters encompassing: Northeast Asia (Japan, China, South Korea) including Taiwan; Southeast Asia (the 10 member states of ASEAN), including Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste; Southwest Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, South Pacific).
Together with the United States, Canada, Chile and Brazil, the Trans Pacific Partnership constitutes roughly 76 percent of the world’s GDP.
Indonesia is one of the world’s geopolitical “regional pivotal states” along with Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Australia, the latter seven being co-members of the G20.
In diplomatic forums Indonesia participates in the UN system, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), ASEAN, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and since 2008, in the G20.
Within the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), Indonesia strives to cooperate and maintain intra ASEAN stability with its nine fellow member states in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia.
The three pillars of the ASC (Political-Security, Economic and Social-Cultural) reinforce constructive engagement and maintain a balanced “strategic space” by accommodating the interests of extra regional powers (the US, Japan, China, India and Russia).
Australia and New Zealand both play critical security assurance roles in sustaining this constant “rebalancing engagement” in Southeast Asia.
As the largest ASEAN member state in terms of geographical size, population, and economy, Indonesia’s role is to emphasize collaborative rather than assertive leadership. Indonesia believes that effective and credible leadership within the ASC rest on our improved domestic political cohesion, economic development and national security through provision of good governance, equitable economic development and social justice at home.
A secure ASEAN environment is in our strategic interest just as a stable Indonesia is in the interests of all our ASEAN partners.
As the world’s largest economy, the United States’ military presence in Asia and the Pacific has long defined Asia Pacific security. Throughout the Cold War (1947-1990) and beyond (1990-present), the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) held its role as the “main security provider”.
That preponderance provided its treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to secure 80 percent of energy supplies from the Middle East within a stable Northeast Asia-Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean environment.
It also enabled Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and eventually China to accumulate today’s combined GDP of almost US$12 trillion, whilst at the same time underwriting America’s trade and fiscal deficits.
American military preponderance secured both the intra-regional and trans-regional strategic balance. Japan, South Korea and (since 1978) China provided economic, trade and investment commitments, leading ASEAN to become today a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of $1.3 trillion.
The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast and Southeast Asia were facilitated by America’s critical role as “regional balancer” underpinning trans-regional security.
The political prominence and economic rise of Japan (GDP $5 trillion), China ($4.8 trillion) and India ($2.4 trillion) lead to graduated desire to increase their political and security presence within each countries “core area of interest” as well as beyond.
In the next 10-15 years ASEAN needs to re-calibrate the strength and quality of its combined conventional forces presence in ways that accommodate the imperative to “co-determine” the terms and conditions of western Asia Pacific security without upsetting the rebalancing process among the major powers, including Russia.
Indonesia’s vision within the ASC is to provide “strategic space” and as well as maintain “technological parity” among all residents as well as among extra-regional powers in order that multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity reinforce one another.
This new regional security architecture need to secure 38 percent of the world’s 90 percent seaborne trade passing through the straits of Southeast Asia, including the three sea lines of communications traversing the Indonesian archipelago.
The real challenge is to coordinate and synchronize public and private business leaders to harness a concerted vision based on each country’s distinct geopolitical location relative to its geoeconomic competitive strength.
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify success in utilizing “brainpower” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources.
What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must leadership groups in government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect, cooperate and, at the same time, compete with one another as well as with the rest of the world? Of the annual US$190 trillion global financial market transactions, more than 60 percent connect financial hubs in the Asia Pacific region.
What will be the role of traditional “military power” compared to the growing importance of “non-military warfare” such as the “battle” over brain-ware, creativity, ideas and innovation? What is the optimum mix matching the ability to “deter and destruct” physical targets with the ability to “capture and secure” market share, financial assets and intellectual property? Countries with sizeable populations and large territories must adopt a comprehensive policy vision simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local, so that claims over strategic resources in disputed areas can be resolved through rules-based mediation and peaceful negotiation.
There is need for more skilled and educationally trained military officers who are able to interface the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where “non-military battles” of ideas, of technological knowhow and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” competitive world. In all Asia Pacific countries the “war-room”, the “board-room” and the “class-room” must interface continuously.
Only in this way can Indonesia’s future generation of military leaders and defense managers ensure that the shared responsibility within ASEAN to sustain multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic development will justly reward our shared vision of planning ahead in safeguarding peace and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific region.
The writer is a former defense minister. The article is a summary of a presentation by the writer at the Centre for Defense and Strategic Studies, Canberra, Australia, on May 3, 2010.
Source: The Jakarta Post
Read More..
Indonesia’s strategic vision is defined by its strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic location which defines its perennial interest in keeping track of security trends in the linkages of regional clusters encompassing: Northeast Asia (Japan, China, South Korea) including Taiwan; Southeast Asia (the 10 member states of ASEAN), including Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste; Southwest Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, South Pacific).
Together with the United States, Canada, Chile and Brazil, the Trans Pacific Partnership constitutes roughly 76 percent of the world’s GDP.
Indonesia is one of the world’s geopolitical “regional pivotal states” along with Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Australia, the latter seven being co-members of the G20.
In diplomatic forums Indonesia participates in the UN system, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), ASEAN, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and since 2008, in the G20.
Within the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), Indonesia strives to cooperate and maintain intra ASEAN stability with its nine fellow member states in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia.
The three pillars of the ASC (Political-Security, Economic and Social-Cultural) reinforce constructive engagement and maintain a balanced “strategic space” by accommodating the interests of extra regional powers (the US, Japan, China, India and Russia).
Australia and New Zealand both play critical security assurance roles in sustaining this constant “rebalancing engagement” in Southeast Asia.
As the largest ASEAN member state in terms of geographical size, population, and economy, Indonesia’s role is to emphasize collaborative rather than assertive leadership. Indonesia believes that effective and credible leadership within the ASC rest on our improved domestic political cohesion, economic development and national security through provision of good governance, equitable economic development and social justice at home.
A secure ASEAN environment is in our strategic interest just as a stable Indonesia is in the interests of all our ASEAN partners.
As the world’s largest economy, the United States’ military presence in Asia and the Pacific has long defined Asia Pacific security. Throughout the Cold War (1947-1990) and beyond (1990-present), the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) held its role as the “main security provider”.
That preponderance provided its treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to secure 80 percent of energy supplies from the Middle East within a stable Northeast Asia-Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean environment.
It also enabled Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and eventually China to accumulate today’s combined GDP of almost US$12 trillion, whilst at the same time underwriting America’s trade and fiscal deficits.
American military preponderance secured both the intra-regional and trans-regional strategic balance. Japan, South Korea and (since 1978) China provided economic, trade and investment commitments, leading ASEAN to become today a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of $1.3 trillion.
The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast and Southeast Asia were facilitated by America’s critical role as “regional balancer” underpinning trans-regional security.
The political prominence and economic rise of Japan (GDP $5 trillion), China ($4.8 trillion) and India ($2.4 trillion) lead to graduated desire to increase their political and security presence within each countries “core area of interest” as well as beyond.
In the next 10-15 years ASEAN needs to re-calibrate the strength and quality of its combined conventional forces presence in ways that accommodate the imperative to “co-determine” the terms and conditions of western Asia Pacific security without upsetting the rebalancing process among the major powers, including Russia.
Indonesia’s vision within the ASC is to provide “strategic space” and as well as maintain “technological parity” among all residents as well as among extra-regional powers in order that multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity reinforce one another.
This new regional security architecture need to secure 38 percent of the world’s 90 percent seaborne trade passing through the straits of Southeast Asia, including the three sea lines of communications traversing the Indonesian archipelago.
The real challenge is to coordinate and synchronize public and private business leaders to harness a concerted vision based on each country’s distinct geopolitical location relative to its geoeconomic competitive strength.
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify success in utilizing “brainpower” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources.
What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must leadership groups in government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect, cooperate and, at the same time, compete with one another as well as with the rest of the world? Of the annual US$190 trillion global financial market transactions, more than 60 percent connect financial hubs in the Asia Pacific region.
What will be the role of traditional “military power” compared to the growing importance of “non-military warfare” such as the “battle” over brain-ware, creativity, ideas and innovation? What is the optimum mix matching the ability to “deter and destruct” physical targets with the ability to “capture and secure” market share, financial assets and intellectual property? Countries with sizeable populations and large territories must adopt a comprehensive policy vision simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local, so that claims over strategic resources in disputed areas can be resolved through rules-based mediation and peaceful negotiation.
There is need for more skilled and educationally trained military officers who are able to interface the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where “non-military battles” of ideas, of technological knowhow and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” competitive world. In all Asia Pacific countries the “war-room”, the “board-room” and the “class-room” must interface continuously.
Only in this way can Indonesia’s future generation of military leaders and defense managers ensure that the shared responsibility within ASEAN to sustain multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic development will justly reward our shared vision of planning ahead in safeguarding peace and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific region.
The writer is a former defense minister. The article is a summary of a presentation by the writer at the Centre for Defense and Strategic Studies, Canberra, Australia, on May 3, 2010.
Source: The Jakarta Post
Six decades of Sino-Indonesian relations and ‘Realpolitik’
In October 1949, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Zhongguo Gongchandang or the Communist Party of China proclaimed the establishment of the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo or The People’s Republic of China.
In December 1949, the Dutch Government acknowledged the existence of the Republic of Indonesia, which had declared its own independence on Aug. 17, 1945.
Amid the complex chaos surrounding both governments to get their state matters in order, the PRC and the Indonesian governments seem not to have neglected their bilateral relations.
On April 13, 1950, the PRC and Indonesia established diplomatic relations, and soon thereafter both governments were engaged in increasingly close cooperation marked by a strong anti-colonialism spirit. It was very natural considering the prevailing zeitgeist among the new states of the world at that time.
In April 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai visited Indonesia to attend the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung that paved the way towards the power consolidation of the newly independent Asian-African countries.
President Sukarno visited China in 1956 for the first time. In 1930 he already mentioned that “Whoever holds the environs of China will control the affairs of the entire Eastern world”. (Hong Liu: Constructing a China metaphor: Sukarno’s perception of the PRC and Indonesia’s political transformation. 1997)
In November 1961, president Liu Shaoqi visited Jakarta to sign a Treaty of Friendship, and in April 1964 foreign minister Marshal Chen Yi visited Jakarta in preparation of the second Asian-African Conference.
The Treaty of Friendship, however, proves to hold for five years only to entail in severance of diplomatic relations by Indonesia under president Soeharto in October 1967 following the alleged Communist coup d’état attempt in 1965.
Soon things got turbulent in China as well as in Indonesia. In China, Chairman Mao Zedong
had launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which would last for a decade, to which many people including high ranking officials fell victim.
In Indonesia, president Soeharto who took over the helm from president Sukarno worked towards economic development to overcome the state bankruptcy, while at the same time purging those suspected of having Communist affiliations.
Nevertheless, things in China started to change course in 1974, when Premier Zhou Enlai managed to convince Chairman Mao Zedong to reinstall Deng Xiaoping as First Vice-Premier.
However, it was only in 1977 following the demise of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 that Deng Xiaoping put an end to the Cultural Revolution and launched the “Beijing Spring”.
In December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping officially announced the launch of the “Four Modernizations” (Sige Xiandaihua), formally marking the beginning of the reform era.
The tense Sino-Indonesian bilateral relations began to ease in the 1980s, despite much debate and back and forth on the Indonesian domestic side. As a result, resumption of diplomatic relations took place only on Aug. 8, 1990 followed by a state visit by Premier Li Peng. Indonesia eventually seemed to realize that we had to respond to the change in global politics anyway.
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s internal dynamics that led to de-regulation and de-bureaucratization in the private sector had very likely contributed to refurbishment in its foreign policy as well.
The fall of then president Soeharto in May 1998 that substantially changed Indonesia’s political paradigm brought about further development into the Sino-Indonesian relations.
It came to a lively exchange of high ranking official visits between the two governments. In April 2005 defense minister Juwono Sudarsono was instrumental to the drawing-up of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership with his counterpart Gen. Cao Gangchuan.
Nonetheless, the economic and business field between the two countries demonstrates much more dynamism compared to the defense sector, notwithstanding the widespread acknowledgement that Indonesia is more on the receiving end of Chinese wide-ranging products. Despite Indonesia’s significant exports to the PRC, China is flooding Indonesia with all kinds of products, just name it: from heavy equipment down to sewing needles and footwear.
There should be no illusion expected from the renewed Sino-Indonesian relations, however, as it was aptly formulated by then Ambassador Lan Lijun in May 2006: “Our strategic partnership is a new type of state-to-state relationship that is based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.” (Xinhua, May 10, 2006).
Nonetheless, Indonesia simply cannot afford to ignore the PRC for many reasons. The PRC holds almost US$1 trillion of US bonds and it is only a matter of time that it will takeover Japan’s position as the number two economic power of the world. It is a military power with ICBM capability with a budget only number two in the world after the US.
The PRC is roaming continents to satisfy its need for raw materials and energy.
What can we make out of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”? The answer lies much in the way we capitalize on our relations with the PRC. What lesson can we draw from the six decade dynamics of the Sino-Indonesian relations?
Lesson number one should remind us to the classic but basic adagium that there is no eternal friend or foe in the relations among nations, no matter how sweet or bitter it could be or could have been.
Lesson number two tells us that above all, national interests of nations respectively prevail over all calculations they may bring up for better or for worse.
Lesson number three, don’t forget Machiavelli: Like politics, foreign relations are not a matter of like or dislike but rather a question of necessity. In other words: that is exactly Realpolitik as understood by the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898).
The three lessons thus gained would guide us to looking forward to a fair but competitive cooperation between the two countries, which would be carried out peacefully and yet upholding the mutual respect that each country in the world deserves, hopefully leading to the proportional advantage that each country could draw from its bilateral relations.
The writer is Professor at the School of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.
In December 1949, the Dutch Government acknowledged the existence of the Republic of Indonesia, which had declared its own independence on Aug. 17, 1945.
Amid the complex chaos surrounding both governments to get their state matters in order, the PRC and the Indonesian governments seem not to have neglected their bilateral relations.
On April 13, 1950, the PRC and Indonesia established diplomatic relations, and soon thereafter both governments were engaged in increasingly close cooperation marked by a strong anti-colonialism spirit. It was very natural considering the prevailing zeitgeist among the new states of the world at that time.
In April 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai visited Indonesia to attend the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung that paved the way towards the power consolidation of the newly independent Asian-African countries.
President Sukarno visited China in 1956 for the first time. In 1930 he already mentioned that “Whoever holds the environs of China will control the affairs of the entire Eastern world”. (Hong Liu: Constructing a China metaphor: Sukarno’s perception of the PRC and Indonesia’s political transformation. 1997)
In November 1961, president Liu Shaoqi visited Jakarta to sign a Treaty of Friendship, and in April 1964 foreign minister Marshal Chen Yi visited Jakarta in preparation of the second Asian-African Conference.
The Treaty of Friendship, however, proves to hold for five years only to entail in severance of diplomatic relations by Indonesia under president Soeharto in October 1967 following the alleged Communist coup d’état attempt in 1965.
Soon things got turbulent in China as well as in Indonesia. In China, Chairman Mao Zedong
had launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which would last for a decade, to which many people including high ranking officials fell victim.
In Indonesia, president Soeharto who took over the helm from president Sukarno worked towards economic development to overcome the state bankruptcy, while at the same time purging those suspected of having Communist affiliations.
Nevertheless, things in China started to change course in 1974, when Premier Zhou Enlai managed to convince Chairman Mao Zedong to reinstall Deng Xiaoping as First Vice-Premier.
However, it was only in 1977 following the demise of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 that Deng Xiaoping put an end to the Cultural Revolution and launched the “Beijing Spring”.
In December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping officially announced the launch of the “Four Modernizations” (Sige Xiandaihua), formally marking the beginning of the reform era.
The tense Sino-Indonesian bilateral relations began to ease in the 1980s, despite much debate and back and forth on the Indonesian domestic side. As a result, resumption of diplomatic relations took place only on Aug. 8, 1990 followed by a state visit by Premier Li Peng. Indonesia eventually seemed to realize that we had to respond to the change in global politics anyway.
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s internal dynamics that led to de-regulation and de-bureaucratization in the private sector had very likely contributed to refurbishment in its foreign policy as well.
The fall of then president Soeharto in May 1998 that substantially changed Indonesia’s political paradigm brought about further development into the Sino-Indonesian relations.
It came to a lively exchange of high ranking official visits between the two governments. In April 2005 defense minister Juwono Sudarsono was instrumental to the drawing-up of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership with his counterpart Gen. Cao Gangchuan.
Nonetheless, the economic and business field between the two countries demonstrates much more dynamism compared to the defense sector, notwithstanding the widespread acknowledgement that Indonesia is more on the receiving end of Chinese wide-ranging products. Despite Indonesia’s significant exports to the PRC, China is flooding Indonesia with all kinds of products, just name it: from heavy equipment down to sewing needles and footwear.
There should be no illusion expected from the renewed Sino-Indonesian relations, however, as it was aptly formulated by then Ambassador Lan Lijun in May 2006: “Our strategic partnership is a new type of state-to-state relationship that is based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.” (Xinhua, May 10, 2006).
Nonetheless, Indonesia simply cannot afford to ignore the PRC for many reasons. The PRC holds almost US$1 trillion of US bonds and it is only a matter of time that it will takeover Japan’s position as the number two economic power of the world. It is a military power with ICBM capability with a budget only number two in the world after the US.
The PRC is roaming continents to satisfy its need for raw materials and energy.
What can we make out of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”? The answer lies much in the way we capitalize on our relations with the PRC. What lesson can we draw from the six decade dynamics of the Sino-Indonesian relations?
Lesson number one should remind us to the classic but basic adagium that there is no eternal friend or foe in the relations among nations, no matter how sweet or bitter it could be or could have been.
Lesson number two tells us that above all, national interests of nations respectively prevail over all calculations they may bring up for better or for worse.
Lesson number three, don’t forget Machiavelli: Like politics, foreign relations are not a matter of like or dislike but rather a question of necessity. In other words: that is exactly Realpolitik as understood by the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898).
The three lessons thus gained would guide us to looking forward to a fair but competitive cooperation between the two countries, which would be carried out peacefully and yet upholding the mutual respect that each country in the world deserves, hopefully leading to the proportional advantage that each country could draw from its bilateral relations.
The writer is Professor at the School of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.
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Indonesia and the World 2010 (Part 2 of 2)
Marty M. Natalegawa
Indonesia's preoccupation with various global challenges in 2010 will not be at the expense of its commitment to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of its own region - Southeast Asia.
Almost mirroring Indonesia's democratic transformation over the past decade, the period since 2003 when Indonesia last held the Chairmanship of ASEAN, has witnessed ASEAN's own evolution towards an ASEAN Community.
This development has not been an accident. For Indonesia, the evolution of an ASEAN that is more alert to democratic principles and good governance is critical to ensure that there would not be a disconnect or divide between the transformation that has taken place within Indonesia and the regional milieu.
In 2010, with the Charter in place, ASEAN has all the Community which we all aspire by 2015. The urgency of concrete action by ASEAN cannot be underestimated.
In the broader region, the past year saw renewed interest in the idea of an East Asia or Asia-Pacific wide regional architecture.
Renewed because for Indonesia it is a debate that we had anticipated by forging ahead with the concept of an ASEAN Community. For Indonesia, there cannot be an East Asian community or an Asia Pacific without an ASEAN Community as its core constituent.
Thus, the ASEAN Community, the various "ASEAN +" processes, the ARF, APEC and East Asia Summit constitute a multi-pronged path towards an East Asia community with ASEAN playing a central role. This is a vision that will continue to guide us in 2010.
A notable emphasis, however, is the need to ensure that nationally, within our own borders, Indonesia itself is ready, including in terms of its national connectivity, in order to fully benefit from the regional community-building efforts.
Our global and regional diplomatic efforts will be underpinned by solid bilateral diplomacy.
In keeping with the tagline "one thousand friends, zero enemies", our foreign policy in 2010 will actively seek to raise to a higher level existing ties with countries in all corners of the globe - the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and the Americas. In this connection, besides the promotion of positive political and people-to-people relations, there will be renewed and focused efforts to promote economic diplomacy.
The promotion of trade, investment and tourism is critical to ensure that foreign policy brings tangible contribution to our development efforts. The foreign policy machinery will be galvanized for this purpose.
A special focus for our efforts will be in border diplomacy - namely to make headway in addressing outstanding border delineation and demarcation issues with neighboring states through negotiations.
Not least, foreign policy in 2010 will also be cognizant of so called "intermestic issues" - those which reflect the blurring of boundaries between international and domestic issues. One such issue is the question of protection of our nationals overseas, principally Indonesian workers overseas.
Indonesian foreign policy will strive to ensure a better recognition that there is natural mutually beneficial relationship between the host country and the sending country: that each Indonesian worker is after all making contribution to the country in which he/she finds employment, while conversely earning their living.
This fact must find better manifestation in the manner in which the responsibilities and rights of workers overseas are recognized. Indonesian foreign policy in 2010 will strive to ensure that the necessary legal frameworks are in place.
Above all, however, Indonesian foreign policy, indeed, each and every Indonesian diplomat, will continue to be imbued with the principles of partiality towards and protection for Indonesian nationals - without exception.
One issue that is also likely to continue to preoccupy is the efforts to overcome terrorism. Indonesia's foreign policy in 2010 will continue employing bilateral, regional and global efforts to overcome this threat.
It will also continue to address the so-called conditions conducive or root causes of terrorism. Inter-faith dialogue through bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation will be at the forefront of our diplomacy. Indeed, the entire spectrum of "soft power" will occupy a central place in our foreign policy.
I am of the firm view that to be effective, foreign policy demands a strong sense of ownership and participation by the stakeholders. Thus, democratization of Indonesian foreign policy will be key. On the one hand, this of course, relates to substance.
Indonesian foreign policy as we begin this second decade of the 21st century must reflect the democratic transformation within. However, it also relates to process. The foreign policy machinery must be open to interaction with stakeholders and, above all to new ideas and opportunities. The partnership and engagement with the DPR (the House of Representatives), more specifically its Commission I, is especially valued and critical. Foreign policy and diplomacy unites.
I do genuinely believe that Indonesian foreign policy stands at a cross road. We have an opportunity to take Indonesia's international role to another level. A country engaged constructively in its own region and at the same time able to contribute significantly to global issues and concerns.
Such a role, of course, must be earned through the quality of our diplomacy. Through the contribution of the men and women who make up our diplomatic machinery, whose dedication and hard work I wish to acknowledge today.
Above all, through the support and partnership of all stakeholders. Insya Allah (God willing).
The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister's annual policy statement on Jan. 8, 2010.
Source: The Jakarta Post
Indonesia's preoccupation with various global challenges in 2010 will not be at the expense of its commitment to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of its own region - Southeast Asia.
Almost mirroring Indonesia's democratic transformation over the past decade, the period since 2003 when Indonesia last held the Chairmanship of ASEAN, has witnessed ASEAN's own evolution towards an ASEAN Community.
This development has not been an accident. For Indonesia, the evolution of an ASEAN that is more alert to democratic principles and good governance is critical to ensure that there would not be a disconnect or divide between the transformation that has taken place within Indonesia and the regional milieu.
In 2010, with the Charter in place, ASEAN has all the Community which we all aspire by 2015. The urgency of concrete action by ASEAN cannot be underestimated.
In the broader region, the past year saw renewed interest in the idea of an East Asia or Asia-Pacific wide regional architecture.
Renewed because for Indonesia it is a debate that we had anticipated by forging ahead with the concept of an ASEAN Community. For Indonesia, there cannot be an East Asian community or an Asia Pacific without an ASEAN Community as its core constituent.
Thus, the ASEAN Community, the various "ASEAN +" processes, the ARF, APEC and East Asia Summit constitute a multi-pronged path towards an East Asia community with ASEAN playing a central role. This is a vision that will continue to guide us in 2010.
A notable emphasis, however, is the need to ensure that nationally, within our own borders, Indonesia itself is ready, including in terms of its national connectivity, in order to fully benefit from the regional community-building efforts.
Our global and regional diplomatic efforts will be underpinned by solid bilateral diplomacy.
In keeping with the tagline "one thousand friends, zero enemies", our foreign policy in 2010 will actively seek to raise to a higher level existing ties with countries in all corners of the globe - the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and the Americas. In this connection, besides the promotion of positive political and people-to-people relations, there will be renewed and focused efforts to promote economic diplomacy.
The promotion of trade, investment and tourism is critical to ensure that foreign policy brings tangible contribution to our development efforts. The foreign policy machinery will be galvanized for this purpose.
A special focus for our efforts will be in border diplomacy - namely to make headway in addressing outstanding border delineation and demarcation issues with neighboring states through negotiations.
Not least, foreign policy in 2010 will also be cognizant of so called "intermestic issues" - those which reflect the blurring of boundaries between international and domestic issues. One such issue is the question of protection of our nationals overseas, principally Indonesian workers overseas.
Indonesian foreign policy will strive to ensure a better recognition that there is natural mutually beneficial relationship between the host country and the sending country: that each Indonesian worker is after all making contribution to the country in which he/she finds employment, while conversely earning their living.
This fact must find better manifestation in the manner in which the responsibilities and rights of workers overseas are recognized. Indonesian foreign policy in 2010 will strive to ensure that the necessary legal frameworks are in place.
Above all, however, Indonesian foreign policy, indeed, each and every Indonesian diplomat, will continue to be imbued with the principles of partiality towards and protection for Indonesian nationals - without exception.
One issue that is also likely to continue to preoccupy is the efforts to overcome terrorism. Indonesia's foreign policy in 2010 will continue employing bilateral, regional and global efforts to overcome this threat.
It will also continue to address the so-called conditions conducive or root causes of terrorism. Inter-faith dialogue through bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation will be at the forefront of our diplomacy. Indeed, the entire spectrum of "soft power" will occupy a central place in our foreign policy.
I am of the firm view that to be effective, foreign policy demands a strong sense of ownership and participation by the stakeholders. Thus, democratization of Indonesian foreign policy will be key. On the one hand, this of course, relates to substance.
Indonesian foreign policy as we begin this second decade of the 21st century must reflect the democratic transformation within. However, it also relates to process. The foreign policy machinery must be open to interaction with stakeholders and, above all to new ideas and opportunities. The partnership and engagement with the DPR (the House of Representatives), more specifically its Commission I, is especially valued and critical. Foreign policy and diplomacy unites.
I do genuinely believe that Indonesian foreign policy stands at a cross road. We have an opportunity to take Indonesia's international role to another level. A country engaged constructively in its own region and at the same time able to contribute significantly to global issues and concerns.
Such a role, of course, must be earned through the quality of our diplomacy. Through the contribution of the men and women who make up our diplomatic machinery, whose dedication and hard work I wish to acknowledge today.
Above all, through the support and partnership of all stakeholders. Insya Allah (God willing).
The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister's annual policy statement on Jan. 8, 2010.
Source: The Jakarta Post
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Part 1 of 2: Indonesia and the world 2010
Marty M. Natalegawa
By any measure, the first decade of the 21st century has been a momentous one for Indonesia. The decade witnessed the transformation of Indonesia into what has been hailed as the third largest democracy in the world.
As a result, some one quarter billion of humanity now enjoys the civil and political rights, in addition to economic and social rights hitherto denied them. A solid evidence that democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand in hand.
Not least, the past decade has proven another indisputable fact: the resilience of the Indonesian nation. Where once political obituaries were written about the demise of Indonesia gripped by multi dimensional crisis, not least separatist threats, Indonesia today is thriving as never before. Above all, where once self-generated doubts were common among some quarters about Indonesia’s role in the world, today opportunities abound.
Indeed, where foreign policy is concerned, the year ahead promises much in solidifying Indonesia’s place in the world: the reaping of its democratic dividend. A nation able to strengthen its contribution within its immediate region of Southeast Asia and yet at the same time enhancing its global interests and concerns. A nation able to concretize its vision of a thousand friends and zero enemy. All aimed at promoting its national interests.
Of course, in carrying out its foreign policy this year, Indonesia, like other nations, cannot be oblivious to the external milieu it is likely to face. If the past year provides any guide, it is that we are truly in the midst of a transformational phase in international relations. The tests the international community faced in 2009 make for a depressing list: financial, economic, energy and food crisis; threat of global pandemic; the challenge of climate change.
These are just a few examples. Multifaceted in its form and simultaneous in time. Their trans-boundary and indeed global nature remind that comprehensive solutions can be found only by means of international cooperation. Even the mightiest of nations find it impossible to address issues whose enduring characteristic is their non conformity with state boundaries. The year 2010 is unlikely to be any different. Thus, multilateral approach and solutions remain indispensable.
In 2010, Indonesia will continue to invest heavily in its multilateral diplomacy. The United Nations must remain central in addressing the various global challenges and crisis we are likely to face in the year ahead. To be effective, however, reform of the UN, in particular its Security Council, to better reflect the contemporary world, is essential.
Indonesia will continue to be at the forefront in promoting the role of the United Nations in tackling global crises and at the same time in calling for its reform. Democratization of governance, after all, extends beyond national boundaries. Democratization of global institutions and governance is equally key.
While confronting newly arisen crisis is the task of United Nations, its Charter-mandated responsibilities in promoting economic development and progress cannot be held in abeyance. The year 2010 will be particularly significant as the UN convene a special leaders meeting to review progress made in implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.
Also not to be ignored is the unfinished business of climate change. Despite the nature of the challenge, the Copenhagen conference at the end of 2009, as anticipated, did not quite produce the legally binding outcome. Yet, it is important that positive momentum continue to be built with the objective of reaching a legally binding commitment during the course of 2010. Inaction is not an option.
Indonesia’s diplomacy will continue to actively strive to promote consensus and, at the same time, through concrete national actions, demonstrate what can be achieved if each nation shoulder its own responsibilities. Indeed, the year ahead is expected to bear witness to an enhanced role by Indonesia in building bridges among divides.
Our foreign policy will consistently project Indonesia as part of the solution to various global challenges; of a country keen to accentuate the overlapping of interests and concerns rather than competing interests and concerns. Such bridge-building endeavor will extend beyond the United Nations to include other multilateral fora within which Indonesia is active and in confronting the multitude of issues confronting the international community. Of note, among them, is Indonesia’s participation within the G20.
As G20 confirms its status as the premier forum on economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to carve a niche within the Group that is unique to itself as the world’s third largest democracy, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population and a voice of moderation. While we are likely to continue to confront transformational challenges in 2010 – at the same time, perennial and “traditional”, political and security challenges will continue. This mix of the traditional and non-traditional; the old and new is a reality that challenges the conduct of our foreign policy.
In the Middle East, Israeli-sourced violence and violation of international law and previously agreed commitments persist. Indonesia will continue to consistently support the Palestinian cause and the peace process aimed at realizing an independent Palestinian State. The reinvigoration of diplomatic efforts by the Quartet, including the United States, must be encouraged. Nor would Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2010 be oblivious to continuing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There has not been a deficit of international attention on the situation in the aforementioned countries. Indonesia for its part will stand ready to contribute in a manner that is in keeping with its own capacities and foreign policy principles and, of course, based on the assessed needs identified by the countries themselves.
Despite the renewed attention on the perceived nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula and Iran, the year 2010 is likely to be notable for the likely promise it offers to make substantial progress on efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons. The responsibilities resting on the nuclear weapon states to ensure deep cuts in their nuclear armaments are clear.
Nationally, as well as Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement on disarmament issues, Indonesia will play an active role in the forthcoming NPT review Conference in New York in May 2010. Indonesia also will continue to play an active role within the NAM. Such a role will be complemented by continued active engagement within the G77 as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister’s annual policy statement on Jan. 8.
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As a result, some one quarter billion of humanity now enjoys the civil and political rights, in addition to economic and social rights hitherto denied them. A solid evidence that democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand in hand.
Not least, the past decade has proven another indisputable fact: the resilience of the Indonesian nation. Where once political obituaries were written about the demise of Indonesia gripped by multi dimensional crisis, not least separatist threats, Indonesia today is thriving as never before. Above all, where once self-generated doubts were common among some quarters about Indonesia’s role in the world, today opportunities abound.
Indeed, where foreign policy is concerned, the year ahead promises much in solidifying Indonesia’s place in the world: the reaping of its democratic dividend. A nation able to strengthen its contribution within its immediate region of Southeast Asia and yet at the same time enhancing its global interests and concerns. A nation able to concretize its vision of a thousand friends and zero enemy. All aimed at promoting its national interests.
Of course, in carrying out its foreign policy this year, Indonesia, like other nations, cannot be oblivious to the external milieu it is likely to face. If the past year provides any guide, it is that we are truly in the midst of a transformational phase in international relations. The tests the international community faced in 2009 make for a depressing list: financial, economic, energy and food crisis; threat of global pandemic; the challenge of climate change.
These are just a few examples. Multifaceted in its form and simultaneous in time. Their trans-boundary and indeed global nature remind that comprehensive solutions can be found only by means of international cooperation. Even the mightiest of nations find it impossible to address issues whose enduring characteristic is their non conformity with state boundaries. The year 2010 is unlikely to be any different. Thus, multilateral approach and solutions remain indispensable.
In 2010, Indonesia will continue to invest heavily in its multilateral diplomacy. The United Nations must remain central in addressing the various global challenges and crisis we are likely to face in the year ahead. To be effective, however, reform of the UN, in particular its Security Council, to better reflect the contemporary world, is essential.
Indonesia will continue to be at the forefront in promoting the role of the United Nations in tackling global crises and at the same time in calling for its reform. Democratization of governance, after all, extends beyond national boundaries. Democratization of global institutions and governance is equally key.
While confronting newly arisen crisis is the task of United Nations, its Charter-mandated responsibilities in promoting economic development and progress cannot be held in abeyance. The year 2010 will be particularly significant as the UN convene a special leaders meeting to review progress made in implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.
Also not to be ignored is the unfinished business of climate change. Despite the nature of the challenge, the Copenhagen conference at the end of 2009, as anticipated, did not quite produce the legally binding outcome. Yet, it is important that positive momentum continue to be built with the objective of reaching a legally binding commitment during the course of 2010. Inaction is not an option.
Indonesia’s diplomacy will continue to actively strive to promote consensus and, at the same time, through concrete national actions, demonstrate what can be achieved if each nation shoulder its own responsibilities. Indeed, the year ahead is expected to bear witness to an enhanced role by Indonesia in building bridges among divides.
Our foreign policy will consistently project Indonesia as part of the solution to various global challenges; of a country keen to accentuate the overlapping of interests and concerns rather than competing interests and concerns. Such bridge-building endeavor will extend beyond the United Nations to include other multilateral fora within which Indonesia is active and in confronting the multitude of issues confronting the international community. Of note, among them, is Indonesia’s participation within the G20.
As G20 confirms its status as the premier forum on economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to carve a niche within the Group that is unique to itself as the world’s third largest democracy, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population and a voice of moderation. While we are likely to continue to confront transformational challenges in 2010 – at the same time, perennial and “traditional”, political and security challenges will continue. This mix of the traditional and non-traditional; the old and new is a reality that challenges the conduct of our foreign policy.
In the Middle East, Israeli-sourced violence and violation of international law and previously agreed commitments persist. Indonesia will continue to consistently support the Palestinian cause and the peace process aimed at realizing an independent Palestinian State. The reinvigoration of diplomatic efforts by the Quartet, including the United States, must be encouraged. Nor would Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2010 be oblivious to continuing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There has not been a deficit of international attention on the situation in the aforementioned countries. Indonesia for its part will stand ready to contribute in a manner that is in keeping with its own capacities and foreign policy principles and, of course, based on the assessed needs identified by the countries themselves.
Despite the renewed attention on the perceived nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula and Iran, the year 2010 is likely to be notable for the likely promise it offers to make substantial progress on efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons. The responsibilities resting on the nuclear weapon states to ensure deep cuts in their nuclear armaments are clear.
Nationally, as well as Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement on disarmament issues, Indonesia will play an active role in the forthcoming NPT review Conference in New York in May 2010. Indonesia also will continue to play an active role within the NAM. Such a role will be complemented by continued active engagement within the G77 as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
The writer is Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The article is an abridged version of the minister’s annual policy statement on Jan. 8.
Indonesia and the G20
By Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, WASHINGTON D.C.
During the November 2008 Summit in Washington, D.C., the leaders of advanced economies stood on an equal footing with their emerging nations’ counterparts addressing the global economic and financial issues candidly.
The deliberations yielded clear instructions to their relevant ministers and enabled officials to put flesh on the action plan to be immediately implemented to restore global confidence and generate further reforms in the world’s financial systems.
This was an unprecedented joint endeavor involving countries which represent 85 percent of the US$60 trillion global economy, 80 percent of global trade and 67 percent of the world’s population. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia alone have a combined population of almost 3.2 billion people and a collective GDP of $8.4 trillion, or about 15 percent of the world’s GDP.
The United States has been instrumental in leading and pulling together those countries and members of the G20, yet going forward, another key factor in the equation would be President Barack Obama and his priority on the G20 process. In his campaign promises outlined in March 2008 and on several occasions lately, Obama called for an overhaul of the financial system and to establish a 21st-century regulatory system. Obama’s administration seemed to be less aligned with its European counterparts in suggesting larger European stimulus packages and on the issue of regulations and supervision for all major financial players. Obama’s participation at the April 2 Summit in London and the commitment made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton however, have been a testimony of the present administration’s commitment to the G20 process, particularly on the need to address the present global financial crisis collectively.
For Indonesia, the main policy option will be how best to capitalize on the G20 membership in order to advance its interests, especially as it provides an avenue to engage itself with countries of the G8 as a “global steering group” on high profile and priority issues.
Many policy options preferred by developing countries have found a new channel to be advanced in the summit. Although developing countries like Indonesia have recently been more assertive in their attempt to contribute to the global policy agenda, their impact has been fairly modest. According to a study by Leonardo Martinez-Diaz of the Brookings Institution, in the eight years of G20 Finance Ministers ‘and Central Bank Governors’ meetings, the forum has mainly served as a vehicle for mobilizing support for G7 policies.
Today Indonesia stands in a unique position. It is one among the few and happens to be the only Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) country in the G20 summit process.
Indonesia is among those that are major and middle economic and financial powers, major energy exporters and importers, major players in the global as well as regional security arena, and the major polluters of the world. Indonesia is being positioned in such a way to enable it to connect the region with, and advance its interests in, the G20 process.
Some may construe Indonesia’s membership of this new grouping as a reflection of its growing influence on the world stage. Indonesia has capitalized on a number of short-term but critically important gains for charting a strategic framework of engagement in the G20 summit. It co-chairs the G20 working group on the reform of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks.
Its activism contributes to any future decisions pertaining to larger financial access for developing economies. At the same time, it pushes for a greater voice and representation for developing economies in the functioning of the existing multilateral development banks.
Indonesia had recently shown an economic and financial trajectory which helped cushion the tremendous pressure from the global financial and economic challenges. Strenuous structural reforms to improve the investment climate, strengthen economic fundamentals and the financial sector, as well as strengthen regulatory frameworks and legal systems that have been conducted, bear its present results.
Various other measures that have been taken, such as strengthening the food-based industry, and expanding and improving the quality of health services and education, attune Indonesia to the current circumstances. An expanding middle class is developing. The steps taken, as well as the prevailing circumstances today, have ensured Indonesia fits into the dynamic of the G20 Summit.
What needs to be critically maintained is Indonesia’s participation based on its pragmatic approach; one with its meticulously set priorities of national economic and security interests.
In a grouping such as the G20, alliances will be dynamic, established and re-established constantly on issues of common interests. When, on certain issues, Indonesia needs to align or re-align with countries both within and beyond the grouping, then and only then, Indonesia will be the one who decides whether it can afford to shift alignment in order to pursue the foremost priority of its interests.
The writer is a member of the Indonesian Foreign Service. The views expressed in this article are solely the author’s personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Indonesia
The deliberations yielded clear instructions to their relevant ministers and enabled officials to put flesh on the action plan to be immediately implemented to restore global confidence and generate further reforms in the world’s financial systems.
This was an unprecedented joint endeavor involving countries which represent 85 percent of the US$60 trillion global economy, 80 percent of global trade and 67 percent of the world’s population. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia alone have a combined population of almost 3.2 billion people and a collective GDP of $8.4 trillion, or about 15 percent of the world’s GDP.
The United States has been instrumental in leading and pulling together those countries and members of the G20, yet going forward, another key factor in the equation would be President Barack Obama and his priority on the G20 process. In his campaign promises outlined in March 2008 and on several occasions lately, Obama called for an overhaul of the financial system and to establish a 21st-century regulatory system. Obama’s administration seemed to be less aligned with its European counterparts in suggesting larger European stimulus packages and on the issue of regulations and supervision for all major financial players. Obama’s participation at the April 2 Summit in London and the commitment made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton however, have been a testimony of the present administration’s commitment to the G20 process, particularly on the need to address the present global financial crisis collectively.
For Indonesia, the main policy option will be how best to capitalize on the G20 membership in order to advance its interests, especially as it provides an avenue to engage itself with countries of the G8 as a “global steering group” on high profile and priority issues.
Many policy options preferred by developing countries have found a new channel to be advanced in the summit. Although developing countries like Indonesia have recently been more assertive in their attempt to contribute to the global policy agenda, their impact has been fairly modest. According to a study by Leonardo Martinez-Diaz of the Brookings Institution, in the eight years of G20 Finance Ministers ‘and Central Bank Governors’ meetings, the forum has mainly served as a vehicle for mobilizing support for G7 policies.
Today Indonesia stands in a unique position. It is one among the few and happens to be the only Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) country in the G20 summit process.
Indonesia is among those that are major and middle economic and financial powers, major energy exporters and importers, major players in the global as well as regional security arena, and the major polluters of the world. Indonesia is being positioned in such a way to enable it to connect the region with, and advance its interests in, the G20 process.
Some may construe Indonesia’s membership of this new grouping as a reflection of its growing influence on the world stage. Indonesia has capitalized on a number of short-term but critically important gains for charting a strategic framework of engagement in the G20 summit. It co-chairs the G20 working group on the reform of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks.
Its activism contributes to any future decisions pertaining to larger financial access for developing economies. At the same time, it pushes for a greater voice and representation for developing economies in the functioning of the existing multilateral development banks.
Indonesia had recently shown an economic and financial trajectory which helped cushion the tremendous pressure from the global financial and economic challenges. Strenuous structural reforms to improve the investment climate, strengthen economic fundamentals and the financial sector, as well as strengthen regulatory frameworks and legal systems that have been conducted, bear its present results.
Various other measures that have been taken, such as strengthening the food-based industry, and expanding and improving the quality of health services and education, attune Indonesia to the current circumstances. An expanding middle class is developing. The steps taken, as well as the prevailing circumstances today, have ensured Indonesia fits into the dynamic of the G20 Summit.
What needs to be critically maintained is Indonesia’s participation based on its pragmatic approach; one with its meticulously set priorities of national economic and security interests.
In a grouping such as the G20, alliances will be dynamic, established and re-established constantly on issues of common interests. When, on certain issues, Indonesia needs to align or re-align with countries both within and beyond the grouping, then and only then, Indonesia will be the one who decides whether it can afford to shift alignment in order to pursue the foremost priority of its interests.
The writer is a member of the Indonesian Foreign Service. The views expressed in this article are solely the author’s personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Indonesia
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